The Economist - UK (2019-06-01)

Trendline

CDU/CSU

Germany

TheRepublicans

France

SDPGermany

Die

Grünen

Germany

LesVerts

France

DieLinke

Germany

Alternative

forGermany

Podemos

Spain

Ciudadanos

Spain

National

Rally

France

Brexit

Party‡

Britain

Conservatives

Britain

Labour

Britain

LibDems

Britain

Fidesz†

Hungary

Northern

League

Italy

FiveStarMovement

Italy

Law&Justice

Poland

EnMarche*France

UnsubmissiveFrance

Partiesingreydonot

belongtoa group

DemocraticPartyItaly

SocialistParty

France

Italy’sFiveStar

Movementisa

distinctivecentrist,

anti-EUoutlier↓

Anti-EU

↓

←Farleft Politicalideology Farright→

Position

on

the

EU

↑

Pro-EU

Conservatives

andReformists

EuropeofFreedom

&DirectDemocracy

European

People’s

Pa r ty

Socialistsand

Democrats

UnitedLeft/

NordicGreenLeft

Greens/

European

FreeAlliance

AllianceofLiberals

andDemocrats/

Renaissance

EuropeofNations

andFreedom

Sources:ChapelHillExpertSurvey(2014/2017);ECFR;EuropeanParliament *IncludesMoDemandUDI †CurrentlysuspendedfromtheEPPgroup‡IdeologyanddifferencebasedonUKIP 2014

Parliamentarygrouping 2019 election,provisionalresults,seats 10 20

Anti-EUpartiesclusteratideologicalextremes,whereaspro-EUonesarecentrist

EuropeanParliamentpoliticalpartiesandgroupings

ByideologyandpositionontheEU

Partyname

Changeinseatsfrom 2014 to 2019 elections

Selectedparties,bypositionontheEU

-15 -10 -5 50 10 15 20 25

-1 -10 5 -5 015 015220 5

SDP

DemocraticPartyItaly

SocialistParty

LesVerts

AlternativeforGermany

NationalRally

EnMarche*

←lost gained→

LibDems

Fidesz

UnsubmissiveFrance

FiveStar

Movement

Law& Justice

↑

Pro-EU

CDU/CSU

Podemos

TheRepublicansFrance

DieLinke

Labour

Conservatives

NorthernLeague

BrexitParty‡

DieGrünen

Ciudadanos

Anti-EU

↓

Position

on

the

EU

Stronglypro-and

anti-EUparties

wonseatsfrom

thetraditional

centre-leftand

centre-right

nil

TheEconomistJune 1st 2019 81

E

urosceptics hopedthat populist par-

ties would sweep last week’s European

Parliament elections. But voters delivered

a murky verdict. Eurosceptics did make

progress: parties in the top 15% of hostility

towards the eu, as measured by a survey of

political scientists run by the University of

North Carolina at Chapel Hill, gained 30

seats. Yet parties in the most pro-eu15%

won 32 extra seats. The losers were the

main centre-left and centre-right parties.

For the first time in the parliament’s

history, its two main blocs, the European

People’s Party and the Socialists and Demo-

crats, failed to achieve a majority between

them. In theory, that could turn the Euro-

sceptics into kingmakers. In practice, the

older parties back the euand want nothing

to do with the populists. That will force

them to depend on the liberals instead.

Moreover, the pro-euparties are likely to

form a more cohesive group than their ad-

versaries will.

Almost every possible mix of policy po-

sitions is present among the parliament’s

177 different parties. However, the Chapel

Hill survey shows that some combinations

tend to go together. Its authors assess par-

ties’ views on dozens of issues, and aggre-

gate them into ideological scores. The

study was last run in 2017, so its ratings do

not count recent political shifts. Nonethe-

less, its scores track well with other sur-

veys, and with parties’ own manifestos.

One pattern is the boomerang-shaped

relationship between views on the euon

one hand, and older divides over economic

redistribution and cultural openness on

the other. Before the global financial crisis,

Euroscepticism won few votes. But the eu’s

bailouts of bankrupt member states and

struggles to absorb refugees linked opposi-

tion to European integration with hostility

towards bankers and foreigners. Sensing a

chance to broaden their scope, far-right

and far-left parties sharpened their criti-

cism of the eu, and Eurosceptic parties be-

came more radical on other issues.

As a result, today’s anti-eu parties

mostly land on either the far left (such as

Unsubmissive France) or far right (like the

Alternative for Germany). These two wings

will struggle to find common cause over

economic policy. The biggest exception, It-

aly’s Five Star Movement, sits in the centre

only because it combines policies from

both left and right extremes.

In contrast, the surging pro-euparties,

including France’s En Marche and Britain’s

Liberal Democrats, have much in common.

They combine cultural liberalism with a

centrist economic agenda emphasising

equitable growth. These parties also tend

to back efforts to fight climate change,

making them natural allies of the Green

parties that gained seats across Europe.

European Parliament elections are

sometimes dismissed as a mere opinion

poll, since the body has much less power

than domestic legislatures do. In terms of

votes cast, pro- and anti-euforces battled

to a draw. But the parliament also has real

duties, including approving the eu’s bud-

get and laws. By this measure, liberals may

have won the upper hand. 7

Centrist liberals, not populists, gained

the most power in the euParliament

An equal and

opposite reaction

Graphic detailEurope’s elections