boundaries  of  the period  in  question.   They    are then    liable  to  take    on  the appearance  of  “progressive”
traits  (if they    show    up, as  it  were,   in  advance of  their   assigned    period) or  “regressive”    ones    (if they    show
up  afterward). Not only    does    this    confusion   of  assigned    attribute   with    natural essence contribute  to  the
teleological    view    of  history as  a   directed    march   of  styles  (directed   toward  what,   though, and by  whom?);
it  also    reflects    back    upon    whatever    it  is  that    we  are observing   the values  we  associate   with    terms   like
progressive and regressive, which   are borrowed    from    the language    of  politics    and are never   morally or
emotionally innocent.
When    periods are essentialized,  moreover,   we  may then    begin   seeing  objects classed within  them    in
invidious   comparative terms   as  more    or  less    essentially medieval    or  Renaissance.    We  may become
burdened    with    considerations  of  purity  or  fidelity    to  a   Zeitgeist   (a  “spirit of  the time”)  that    never
burdened    contemporaries. And that    is  because unless  we  are very    cautious    indeed, we  can forget  that    the
Zeitgeist   is  a   concept that    we, not “the    time,”  have    constructed (or abstracted).    We  may then    value   some
objects over    others  as  being   better, or  even    as  being   “the    best”   expressions of  “the    spirit  of  the Middle
Ages”   or  “the    spirit  of  the Renaissance.”   If  this    sort    of  essentialism    seems   innocuous   enough, we  might
transpose   the frame   of  reference   from    the chronological   to  the geographical,   and reflect on  what    happens
when    people  become  concerned   over    the purity  or  genuineness of  one’s   essential   Americanism or
Africanness or  Croathood.
Subdivisions,   in  short,  are necessary   but also    risky.  Periodization,  while   purportedly a   neutral—
which   is  to  say a   “value-free”—conceptual aid,    rarely  manages to  live    up  to  that    purpose.    Values  always
seem    somehow to  get smuggled    in. And this    happens even    when    periodization   is  conducted   on  a   smaller
scale   than    the totality    of  history.    Composers’  careers are also    commonly    periodized. All composers,  even
the ones    who die in  their   twenties    or  thirties,   seem    to  go  through the same    three   periods—early,  middle,
and late.   No  prizes  for guessing    which   period  always  seems   to  contain the freshest    works,  the most
vigorous,   the most    profound.
FIG.    10-5    Giotto  di  Bondone,    The Kiss    of  Judas,  a   wall    painting    from    the Scrovegni   Chapel  in  Padua,  Italy.  Giotto’s    realism and
his adoption    of  ancient Roman   models  have    made    him,    for art historians, the first   “Renaissance”   painter.
The reason  for raising these   questions   now is  that    the fourteenth  century,    and in  particular  the trecento,
has been    a   period  of  contention  with    respect to  musical periodization.  In  art history and the history of
literature, scholars    have    agreed  that    the Florentine  trecento    marks   the beginning   of  the Renaissance ever
since   there   has been    a   concept of  the Renaissance as  a   historiographical   period. (That   is  not as  long    as
one might   think:  the first   historians  to  use the term    as  it  is  used    today,  for purposes    of  periodization,  were
Jules   Michelet    in  1855    and,    with    particular  reference   to  art and literature, Jakob   Burckhardt  in  1860.)  For
