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BloombergBusinessweek June 17, 2019ChinesescientistsmustbesecretlyworkingforChina.
“InthesamewayracialprofilingofAfricanAmericansas
criminalsmaycreatethecrimeof‘drivingwhileblack,’” wrote
Kim,whopracticeslawattheHoustonofficeofGreenberg
Traurig,“profilingofAsianAmericansasspies... maybecreat-
inga newcrime:‘researchingwhileAsian.’”
In2015, FBIagentsstormedthePhiladelphiahomeof
XiaoxingXi,a TempleUniversityphysicist,andarrestedhim
atgunpointinfrontofhiswifeandtwodaughtersforallegedly
sharingsuperconductortechnologywithChina.Thecharges
weredroppedfivemonthslater,afterXi’slawyersprovedthe
systeminquestionwasoldandpubliclyavailable.ButXisays
hislifewillneverbethesame.Helostmostofhisgraduatestu-
dentsandresearchfundingandremainspreoccupiedwithfears
thatthegovernmentis stillspyingonhim.“Seeinghowsucha
trivialthingcouldbetwistedintofelonychargeshashada dra-
maticpsychologicalimpact,”hesays.“Iwasdoingacademic
collaborationthatthegovernment,theuniversity,andallthe
fundingagenciesencouragedustodo.”L
astspring,FBIagentsinHouston,armedwitha batch
ofemailsfromthe 23 accounts,knockedonthedoors
ofatleastfourChineseAmericanswhoworkedat
MDAnderson,askingwhethertheyorothershadprofessional
linkstoChina.Theagentswereparticularlyinterestedinsci-
entistsconnectedtoChina’sThousandTalentsPlan,a govern-
mentinitiativetolurebacktopscholarsfromoverseaswith
well-paidjobsinChina.A reportlastyearbytheU.S.National
IntelligenceCouncilsaidtherecruitmentprogram’sunderlying
purposeis “tofacilitatethelegalandillicittransferofU.S.tech-
nology,intellectualpropertyandknowhow”toChina.
“ItoldthemI wasn’tgoingtosnitch,”saysoneperson,who
wassurprisedtofindtwoagentsathisbackdooroneafternoon.
Theytoldhimnottodiscusstheencounter,saystheperson,
whoaskednottobenamed,andinquiredaboutjointresearch
projectsinChina.Hetriedtoexplainthattherearenosecrets
inbasicscience,becauseeverythinggetspublished.Overtheir
two-hourtalk,hesays,theagentswerelessfocusedonnational
securityissues—say,espionageortradesecrettheft—thanonthe
moresoul-searchingsubjectofloyalty.Theywantedtoknow,
ineffect,areyounoworhaveyoueverbeenmorecommitted
tocuringcancerinChinathanintheU.S.?AnFBIspokesman
wouldn’tcomment,butsaidinanemailthatthebureaucan’t
initiateinvestigations“basedsolelyonanindividual’srace,eth-
nicity,nationaloriginorreligion.”
ThatJune,MDAndersongavetheFBIanotherconsentletter,
thistimepermittingit toshareany“relevantinformation”from
thecancercenter’semployeeaccountswiththeNIHandother
federalagencies.Thatsignaleda newfocusfortheostensible
nationalsecurityinvestigation:compliancewithfederalgrant
requirements.It washerethatWubecamea target.
InfivememosaddressedlastfalltoPisters,MDAnderson’s
president, a top NIH official cited dozens of employee emails
in claiming that Wu and four other scientists at the cancer cen-
ter violated confidentiality requirements in grant reviews andfailed to disclose paid work in China. “Because NIH awards
generally are made to the institution and not the [researcher],
we remind you of the gravity of these concerns,” wrote
MichaelLauer,NIH’sdeputydirectorforoutsideresearch.
HegavePisters 30 daystorespond.
TheinvestigationsoftheMDAnderson employees were
handled by the center’s compliance chief, Max Weber, and
his boss, general counsel Steven Haydon. On the advice of her
lawyer, Wu, who had an often-combative relationship with the
administration, declined to be interviewed by Weber but sub-
mitted written responses to questions. In them she acknowl-
edged lapses, but maintained they weren’t duplicitous. She
admitted sharing NIH grant proposals with U.S. colleagues—
not to leak scientific secrets, she said, but to get help with her
workload. Wu told Weber she used office administrators and
more junior researchers to perform such tasks as download-
ingandprintinggrantproposalsandtypingandeditingreview
drafts.WeberconcludedthatWu’suseofotherstohelpwith
grantreviewsviolatedMDAnderson’sethicspolicies.
If that’strue,thepositionis atoddswithcommonpractice
inacademia.“IfyousearchedthroughMDAnderson or any
large research institution, you’d find people with these kinds
of compliance issues everywhere,” says Lynn Goldman, dean
of the Milken School of Public Health at George Washington
University. Assisting senior scientists with confidential grant
reviews, a rite of passage for many younger researchers, is
considered “part of the mentoring process” by older faculty
members, Goldman says. “Is it wrong? Probably. Is it a capi-
tal offense? Hardly.”
Wu also admitted failing to disclose to the NIH all the names
and affiliations of her Chinese collaborators, as required in grant
filings.ShetoldWeberthatwasbecauseshe’dworkedwith
manyofthemthereinHouston,whentheywerevisitingsci-
entistsatMDAnderson. At any rate, their affiliations in China
were clearly noted in published papers. Weber concluded, in
the report he submitted to Pisters, that visiting scientists were
still “foreign components” and must be disclosed.
Wu acknowledged accepting various honorary titles
and positions in China, such as advisory professor at Fudan
University, her alma mater—but she wasn’t paid, she said. She
produced emails showing she twice withdrew from Thousand
Talents consideration, because the positions entailed too
much travel. In his report, Weber wrote that Wu failed to dis-
close compensated work at several Chinese cancer centers. He
offered no proof that she’d been paid, but included potential
salary amounts for certain positions in his report, conditioned
on “actual work performed,” he wrote. He offered no evidence
that she did any work.
In the end, Weber based most of his conclusions on “adverse
inferences” he drew from Wu’s insistence on responding to his
questions in writing. For example, he cited a 2017 article on the
website of Shanghai’s Ruijin Hospital that said Wu had been
honored at a ceremony after signing a contract to become a vis-
iting professor. “Given Wu’s failure to appear at her interview,
I infer that this fact is true,” Weber wrote.