associated with many of the aristocrats who had overthrown the democracy, but the dislike was in part
genuinely anti-philosophical. Socrates remained for Plato the prototype of the person unconditionally
committed to philosophy; his conception of philosophy changed, but never his conviction of the
importance of Socrates' example.
The later cliché about Socrates was that he turned philosophy from science to ethics; but there had
already been plenty of ethical and political enquiry. What he did was to make philosophy personal again.
He ignored Protagoras' theories about society as much as Anaxagoras' theories about matter, and instead
went around picking on individuals and addressing to each of them the disconcerting and unpopular
question, 'Do you understand what you are talking about?' This naively direct refusal to take at face
value claims to philosophical and other expertise marks a return to Heraclitus' kind of concern: scientific
and sociological enquiries are rejected until we have the self-knowledge to understand the proper use to
make of the results. Until we do, the most urgent task for each person is to turn inwards rather than
outwards; and in keeping with this Socrates refused to write down any teachings or speechify in any
way. Whereas Heraclitus did think he had access to the truth, Socrates represents himself as ignorant,
superior only in argumentative technique and self-awareness; he is, he says, merely the gadfly that stings
people out of their complacency. But he has a much more intellectual conception of understanding and
its requirements than Heraclitus. He argues people into realizing what an undefended mess their views
are. He insists that his questioning will only be halted by a rational defence of the interlocutor's views,
when he can 'give an account' of them. Indeed, we can see a tendency on Socrates' part to demand a
more intellectual articulation than is actually appropriate in the case of the ethical and practical matters
on which his interest centres. He demands that practical capacities, including the virtues, be utterly
transparent to the agent in a rationally articulated form which he can produce and defend, and this seems
a dubious demand. The biographical tradition reinforces our unease by depicting Socrates as in many
ways a weird and inhuman person making excessive demands on human nature in both himself and
others. (But we have little chance of finding out 'what, if any, historical reality lies behind these stories.)
Plato
Plato (C.427-C.347) was an aristocratic Athenian who followed Socrates' example in devoting his life to
philosophy, but did not follow him in his rejection of the permanent written word in favour of personal
encounter. However, although he did write, a great deal, he retained some Socratic suspicion of writing:
Phaedrus 274 b- 277 a is a famous passage where he warns us that written words are dead and cannot
answer back, whereas true philosophy is always a live activity and interchange of thought. Plato's early
writings are designed to avoid these dangers; he rejects the established media of prose (or verse)
exposition for what must have seemed at the time an amazing choice-the dialogue, which had hitherto
been used only for fairly low-grade entertainment. Some of Socrates' other followers, such as
Antisthenes and Aeschines of Sphettus, wrote Socratic dialogues, but only with Plato can we see the
form put to philosophical use. He employs it to present philosophical arguments in a way that ensures
that the listener is stimulated to participate and continue, rather than passively learning off doctrines.
Plato never speaks in his own person, and this makes a certain detachment inevitable; we have to make
what we can of the picture of Socrates arguing. No message is forced on us, but we are made aware of a
problem, and of the need for argument and thought to get further with it.