discussion differ so widely in point and result, it is never made clear what the basic motivation for
Forms is, nor what the range of Forms is, nor what it is (particulars, types, instantiation of qualities) that
they are primarily opposed to. The 'Theory' of Forms is not a theory at all, but an imaginative holding
together of different ideas which we glimpse in different contexts, without getting the chance to demand
answers to questions about the overall structure of the ideas. The 'Theory' appeals to those who can enter
imaginatively into the spirit of it without worrying too much about these questions. It has also been
found fascinating precisely by those who want to press these questions and see whether a single coherent
theory survives when they are made rigorous. The first of these is Aristotle, who in a work On the Forms
distinguishes different arguments for Forms and their implications, and concludes that Plato has no
single coherent theory of Forms (though he finds them compelling enough to develop his own theory of
form).
One of the most disputed questions in recent Platonic scholarship has been whether Plato himself came
later to criticize his earlier indiscriminate acceptance of Forms. In the first part of the Parmenides young
Socrates puts forward what looks like the middle dialogues' conception of Forms, only to have it torn to
shreds by the unhistoric, but symbolic, figures of Parmenides and Zeno. And in other late dialogues
there are many arguments which do in fact undermine some of Plato's earlier uses of Forms. This
certainly looks like self-criticism; but Plato draws no explicit morals. The ideas which for a time he held
together in passionate conviction are quietly allowed to fall apart again, and in the late dialogues he
pursues different interests for their own sake without over-ambitious synthesis.
The late dialogues are a disparate collection of often unattractively written works. In them we no longer
find powerful overall ideas such as Forms or the middle dialogues' model of knowledge; what we do
find are detailed and rich investigations of particular themes, which do not lend themselves to synthesis,
or to individual summary. These dialogues have always been found most rewarding by philosophers,
and this is surely largely due to the fact that in them we find Plato returning to traditional philosophical
concerns which he had earlier impatiently rejected. (It is as true now as when they were written that the
early dialogues appeal to non-philosophers, whereas only a philosopher will get through the Parmenides
and the Sophist.) Not only is Plato taking traditional philosophical questions more seriously, it is
probable that these dialogues were written at a time when Plato had founded a philosophical school, the
'Academy', and come to accept the idea of philosophy as something that could be imparted, as a co-
operative and developing endeavour rather than a matter of intense personal insight. As Plato engages
more and more in the tradition of cosmology, study of society, and investigation of argument,
particularly Eleatic argument, Socrates becomes an increasingly inappropriate and anachronistic
representative of his views.
Repeatedly in these dialogues we find that earlier intransigent attitudes have become modified, and that
Plato is more willing to discuss and take seriously others' philosophical views. Socrates in the Phaedo
sees cosmology merely as a mistake, but in the Timaeus Plato accepts that it is a legitimate part of
philosophy and produces his own (very bizarre) explanation of the physical universe. In the Gorgias
rhetoric is angrily rejected; in the Phaedrus it is an area where superior philosophical understanding can
be advantageously applied. In the Parmenides and Sophist Plato gives careful attention to the structure
and sources of the Eleatic problems which he had hitherto tried to solve by his ambitious theory of