The expediency of conciliating Rome's subjects, however, had been grasped by intelligent men of
differing political complexion, such as the Gracchi, Sulla, Pompey, Cicero, and Cato. Even Caesar, who
was to treat the conquered Gauls with great brutality, tightened up the extortion law. A more difficult
issue was how far to share the profits of empire with the whole citizen body, for there was no conception
of an impersonal 'government' that bestowed specific benefits. The established tradition of aristocratic
largesse made it easy for men who legislated for the distribution of land or money to gain the same
credit and popularity as those whose generosity came from their own pockets. Thus popularis moves to
increase the welfare or power of the equites or the plebs looked like threatening bids for individual
power. It was bad enough when a tribune of the plebs made himself a nuisance in this way; still worse
when the tribune was in league with a senior magistrate. The year 59 presented the spectacle of a consul
who himself behaved like a tribune and had the support, not only of a tribune, but of a general whose
veterans were on the scene. It is not surprising that on the brink of civil war there were Optimates "who
feared nothing so much as the thought of Caesar holding that office again.
Caesar's First Consulship
Caesar began, however, by attempting to secure a smooth passage for his legislation through tact and
diplomacy. The settlement of Pompey's veterans had top priority, and in December of 60 Caesar
solicited the support, or at least the silence, of the best orator in Rome, who had already sabotaged two
previous attempts. Cicero was flattered, but decided to remain independent: he valued the opinion of
Cato and others who had called him 'Father of his Country' after his consulship. In March Cicero
confirmed Caesar's worst fears by indulging in critical remarks about the state of public affairs. Caesar,
with the co-operation of Pompey (both in their priestly capacities), retaliated by carrying out a highly
questionable adoption of Cicero's personal enemy, Clodius, into a plebeian family so that he could be
elected tribune that summer. They no doubt hoped to lure Cicero, this time by fear, into collaboration,
but, if that failed, Clodius would remove the nuisance. Cicero refused invitations from Caesar to serve
on his agrarian commission or accompany him to his province (where he would have provided excellent
company in the long evenings). Cicero paid for his refusal by being sent into exile in 58 for his
execution of the conspirators five years earlier. When he was recalled through Pompey's good offices
over a year later, he was easy to divert from further moves towards independence.
It is important to realize that our best informant was not only hostile to the coalition, but did not enjoy
the confidence of its members. Though Caesar's invitations amply demonstrate that Cicero's political
importance was not a figment of his own vanity, he can offer us only his own intelligent speculations on
the motives and plans of those who came to control the destiny of Rome.
Casesar's other attempt to employ diplomatic methods was also unsuccessful. He carefully omitted from
the agrarian proposal itself all the most controversial features of the earlier bills, excluding the
Campanian land from distribution, using only Pompey's new revenues for purchase of land, and relying
on voluntary sale. He brought the proposal to the Senate and, only after meeting with total and
unreasoned opposition, put it to the Assembly without senatorial sanction. Caesar's colleague in office
was Cato's son-in-law, M. Calpurnius Bibulus, whose obstruction Caesar no doubt hoped to avert by