Cold War 1153of agricultural collectivization. At the same time, workers’ councils sprung up
spontaneously, espousing reform. In 1955, Nagy’s policies drew opposition
from Communist hard-liners, and he was ousted from office. A profound
movement for reform now took root in Hungary. Intellectuals and students
held meetings to discuss possible paths to liberalization. A defiant response
from the new prime minister led to a demonstration of 50,000 people on
October 23, 1956. Protesters smashed a statue of Stalin. Police opened fire
on a crowd trying to storm a radio station. Hungarian troops sent to rout the
demonstrators refused to fire, in some cases joining those now protesting
communism itself. That night, the Hungarian Communist leadership
requested Soviet assistance but also named Nagy as prime minister in the
hope of ending the demonstrations. Western radio broadcasts heard in
Hungary hinted that outside help might be forthcoming, firming popular
resolve. Nagy named a new coalition government that included liberal Com
munists. He began to negotiate with the Soviet government, but he made
clear that he intended to end the one-party system by adding several non
Communists to his government. Furthermore, he called for Hungarian
withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact and asked that Soviet troops be removed
from his country.
To the Soviet government, Hungary’s defection was unthinkable because
it might spark similar movements in other Eastern European nations and
even destabilize the republics of the Soviet Union. On November 4, Nagy
announced that Hungary would withdraw from the Warsaw Pact. While the
French, British, and U.S. governments were preoccupied with the Suez
Canal crisis (see pp. 1164—1167), the Soviet government sent tanks and sol
diers into Budapest and other major Hungarian cities to crush resistance.
Nagy was tried and executed, along with about 2400 other people, perhaps
many more. From 1956 through 1961, almost 400,000 people were found
guilty of political crimes. More than 200,000 Hungarians fled to Western
Europe and the United States. Soviet intervention ended hope that Stalin’s
death might bring about change in Eastern Europe and end the Cold War.
Janos Kadar (1912-1989) became Hungary’s new leader, backed by the
Soviet army. Over the long run, Kadar skillfully liberalized the Communist
regime, while remaining careful not to antagonize unnecessarily the Soviet
Union with any ideological justification for his policies. He relaxed govern
ment control if the interests of the Communist Party were not at stake.
Hungary’s “goulash communism’’ included market-oriented, decentralized
reforms and toleration of some degree of entrepreneurship and profit. The
result was a higher standard of living than existed elsewhere in the Commu
nist world.
With their hands full with Hungary, the Soviets were in no position to
move aggressively against Poland. In any case, Gomulka was careful to
give them no excuse for military action. He gradually rescinded some of the
relatively liberal policies, including toleration of free artistic and political