The Final Crisis 883he happened to be only a few feet from the archduke’s car. He opened fire,
killing Francis Ferdinand and his wife.
Although the Serb government had been aware of the Black Hand nation
alist organization and some individual officials had supported it, the Aus
trian description of the youthful killers as puppets whose strings were pulled
in Belgrade was incorrect. Nonetheless, Serb newspapers virtually cele
brated the death of the Habsburg heir. In Vienna, even those who had dis
liked the archduke for having married a commoner now mourned the couple
fervently.
The Ultimatum
Within the Habsburg imperial administration, many officials immediately
took the view that the chance to crush Serbia had arrived, and that, unlike
1908 and 1912, this time the opportunity would not be missed. The usually
indecisive Austrian foreign minister, Leopold Berchtold, who had opposed
war during the Balkan Crisis of 1912, now took a hard line.
From Berlin, William II urged retaliation, blaming Serbia for the assassi
nation. German Chancellor Theobald von Bethmann-Hollweg (1856—1921)
stubbornly held the view that Germany’s strength must be paramount.
(“Necessity knows no law,” he once said.) Bethmann-Hollweg was now
determined to stay the course with a numbing fatalism undoubtedly accen
tuated by the recent death of his wife. He advised his son not to plant his
estate with trees that would take a long time to grow, because they would
please only the Russians, whom by then he expected to have occupied
northeastern Germany. He expected a war and wanted Russia to appear the
aggressor. In Berlin, the German government gave an Austrian official a
“blank check” to act with knowledge of full German support, that Germany
would, if necessary, fight both France and Russia if those two powers inter
vened once Austria had declared war on Serbia. In this case, Bethmann
Hollweg expected Britain to remain neutral.
But for the moment, Austria-Hungary waited. Berchtold convinced the
Hungarian leaders to support war against Serbia, promising that no Slavs
from territories taken from defeated Serbia would be incorporated into
Austria-Hungary. The Hungarian Social Democrats ended their opposition
to the war. On July 21, 1914, Russian Foreign Minister Sazonov, encouraged
by Maurice Paleologue, the French ambassador, warned Austria-Hungary
against taking any military measures against Serbia.
On July 23, 1914, almost a month after the assassination, the Austrian
ambassador in Belgrade presented a lengthy ultimatum to Serb officials.
It denounced what it claimed was Serb activity aiming to “detach part of
the territories of Austria-Hungary from the Monarchy.” Austro-Hungarian
demands included the end of all anti-Habsburg publications, the dissolu
tion of all Serb nationalist organizations, and a purge of officials and army
officers to be named by Austria-Hungary. The Serb reply was expected