The European Powers and the Eastern Question • 163
dictated the peace terms at San Stefano in February 1878. Because all the
other Great Powers opposed Russia's military and political gains from that
war, the sultan regained some of the Balkan lands in the comprehensive
Treaty of Berlin, signed later in that same year. Russian encouragement of
pan-Slavism was a significant issue in the Balkan Wars of 1912-1913 and
thus the outbreak of World War I in 1914. Although the intricate twists
and turns of the "Eastern Question" from 1774 to 1917 can be confusing,
most historians agree that the Ottomans viewed Russia as their main en¬
emy for most (but not all) of that time.
The Eastern Question centered on whether Russia would gobble up
Turkey's European possessions, especially the Straits, or be stopped from
doing so by the other Great Powers. Although other countries at times ac¬
cepted or even welcomed Russia's growing might (for example, when Rus¬
sian forces helped defeat Napoleon in 1812-1814—or Hitler in 1942-1945,
to jump ahead a bit), they usually tried to prevent a Russian capture of the
Balkans and the Straits, lest it endanger the European balance of power.
Let us explain the workings of this balance of power. There was no way
to decree that each state would have as much power as all the others. After
all, Britain had industrialized first, built up the strongest navy, and acquired
a large overseas empire. France derived more of its wealth from farming
than manufacturing, but it, too, had a big empire and a very strategic loca¬
tion. Austria and Russia each controlled vast areas with large and diverse
populations, necessitating big standing armies. Prussia (which became
Germany in 1871) had a well-armed and disciplined army. Although there
was no way to ensure that each state had equal power, the balance of power
kept any one state or coalition from becoming strong enough to dominate
all the other European countries. Failure to maintain that equilibrium had
enabled Louis XIV and later Napoleon to impose French power over the
rest of the continent, hardly an experience that the British or the Germans
(or any other country) cared to relive. On the same logic, many people in
the nineteenth century feared that if Russia ruled the Balkans and con¬
trolled the Straits, all Europe would be at the mercy of the czars.
Remember also that Russia was, like the US, a continental power and an
expanding one, except that the direction of its growth tended to be east¬
ward as well as southward. Not only the Ottomans but also the Islamized
descendants of the Mongols, Tatars, and Turks who had occupied Central
Asia fell under Russian control in the nineteenth century. When the West
feared that Russian rule in the Balkans would upset the European balance
of power, the czars were also building an empire in cities like Samarqand,
menacing Persia, Afghanistan, and British India.