248 • 14 MODERNIZING RULERS IN THE INDEPENDENT STATES
managed to run up a $300-million debt, despite his government's rising
income. Then came a sensational press story that Sa'ud had bribed a Syr¬
ian minister to kill Egyptian President Gamal Abd al-Nasir, who was at the
peak of his popularity in the Arab world. In 1958, a turbulent year in Arab
politics, the Saudi princes agreed to turn over all executive powers to
Faysal as premier. Six years later, Sa'ud was deposed and Faysal became
king. Under Faysal the Saudi government became much better organized,
with regular ministries, an annual budget, development plans, and new
roads, schools, and hospitals. As Saudi Arabia plunged headlong into
modernity, King Faysal became as influential among Arab rulers and Mus¬
lim conservatives as his father had ever been. His oil policies and eventual
fate are discussed in Chapter 18.
CONCLUSION
Three Middle Eastern countries weathered the period between the two
world wars—the apogee of Western control over the area—without becom¬
ing colonies, protectorates, or mandates. Each country established the bor¬
ders it has had ever since. Each government tightened its hold over groups
that had checked the power of previous rulers. Personal income rose, more
children (and adults) went to school, and public health improved.
These were not democratic regimes. In each case, the agent for change
was a military leader whose successes in war won him the respect and obe¬
dience of his subjects. Other Middle Eastern countries were quick to learn
from them. Army officers became the greatest force for modernization in
the Middle East. As efficiency is essential in military operations, it is natu¬
ral for commanders to apply the same standards and employ similar
methods to modernize their countries. Nationalist leaders can persuade
otherwise recalcitrant subjects to make sacrifices for the common good.
But how much will they give up? And what if conditions change, as has
happened (thanks to oil) in Iran and Saudi Arabia?
These reformers raise other issues. Can modernization be sustained
without a set of shared values between those who order and those who
obey? Kemal Ataturk saw Islam as a barrier to progress and tried to reduce
its influence, but Turkish nationalism has not yet replaced Islam within
the hearts and minds of many Turks. Reza Shah was ambivalent about Is¬
lam, but his reform program empowered a westernized elite at the expense
of Iran's Muslim leaders, who took their revenge after the 1979 revolution.
Ibn Sa'ud's devotion to Islam united a disparate band of tribes under his