Israel's War for Independence • 293In the early days of the war, small bands of poorly armed Israelis had to
ward off large Arab armies. In the northern Negev kibbutz of Yad Mor-
dechai, for example, an Egyptian brigade headed for Tel Aviv was held up
for six days—long enough for Israel to strengthen its defenses farther
north—by a force of fewer than eighty men, women, and teenagers. In
Galilee the beleaguered defenders of the Jewish quarter of Safed set up a
makeshift "cannon," whose loud (but harmless) reports may have fooled
the enemy into fleeing without a fight. It indeed mattered less that Jewish
soldiers outnumbered Arab ones in Palestine than that the Arabs came to
think they did. Ill informed about the character and abilities of the Jews in
Palestine, Arab military leaders tended at first to underestimate them.
When the IDF gradually learned how to counter their early attacks, the
Arabs overreacted and overestimated the Jews' strength. Poor morale was a
major reason for the Arab defeat.
The Outside Powers
The attitudes and policies of the Great Powers confused both sides, but this
confusion hurt the Arabs more than the Israelis. The US and the USSR
clearly favored Israel; both rushed to give it diplomatic recognition. Al¬
though most countries cut off arms to both sides, communist Czechoslova¬
kia sold large quantities of weapons to Israel. In view of their later policies,
why did the USSR and its allies back Israel in 1948? No doubt the Soviets
acted partly on memories of their recent war against Nazi Germany and the
destruction of European Jewry, but the main motives for their policy were
(1) their desire to weaken British influence in the Middle East; (2) their
hope that the new Jewish state would adopt socialism or even communism;
and (3) their need to discredit "feudal" and "bourgeois" Arab regimes. The
US equivocated. Public opinion favored Israel. With a presidential election
approaching, Truman, an incumbent in deep trouble, vied with his Republi¬
can opponents in supporting the Jewish state. However, high officials in the
State Department and the military feared that an anti-Arab stance would
harm the growing US oil interests in the Middle East. Entrepreneurs, edu¬
cators, and missionaries who had spent years in the area argued cogently
against policies that would antagonize the whole Arab world. But Israel's
supporters, especially in Congress, had more clout.
The Arabs expected more support from Britain, which had been quarrel¬
ing with the Zionists since the 1939 White Paper. It had treaties with Iraq
and Egypt permitting British troops to guard airfields and strategic water¬
ways. The commander of Transjordan's Arab Legion, Sir John Bagot Glubb,
and many of his officers were British subjects. Britain also had major oil