Danger Signs in the Middle East • 347influence on their Jewish (and, in some cases, evangelical Christian) con¬
stituents. No Arab pressure group came close to matching AIPAC's power
and perspicacity.
Nixon, hoping to deflect Watergate brickbats, had just named his na¬
tional security adviser, Henry Kissinger, as his secretary of state. A few
Arabs feared that Kissinger, who was Jewish, might back Israel, but he
publicly reassured the Arab countries of his fairness. Eager to promote
détente, Kissinger hoped that the superpowers would stop the arms race
and bring peace to the Middle East, where the danger of a confrontation
remained high.
Arab Frustrations
Both Washington and Jerusalem underestimated the frustration of the
Arab governments over Israel's prolonged and deepening occupation of
the lands taken in 1967. Many pro-Israel observers knew this frustration
existed; but, on the one hand, they assumed that the Arabs were harping
on the territorial issue to distract outsiders from their real aim of destroy¬
ing the Jewish state, and, on the other, they asserted that the Arabs lacked
the will or the power to oust the Israelis. After all, the Arabs had never
fought against Israel without having Egypt in their vanguard. Sadat seem¬
ingly weakened Egypt's ability to fight by ousting his Soviet advisers and
technicians in 1972. However, he warned US and European journalists
that Egypt might soon attack Israeli troops somewhere in the Sinai to cre¬
ate a crisis that would force the superpowers to intervene. His warnings re¬
minded his detractors of his fatuous threats about the "year of decision";
they branded him incapable of decision, either to wage war or to make
peace with Israel.
Actually, Sadat wanted both. A war with Israel would be costly to Egypt,
but if his army and air force, equipped with an impressive arsenal of Soviet
tanks, planes, and missiles, could regain some of the lands Nasir had lost
in 1967, Egypt would be more willing and able to settle with Israel. Even
though the Egyptian economy was in crisis, any peace overtures to Israel
without such a war would cause the richer Arab states to cut off all aid to
Egypt. Sadat had purged his government of any Nasirites who might have
opposed his policies, but the military could have rebelled. Many officers
and soldiers had been kept on alert since 1967 and were thirsting for either
battle or a return to civilian life. Egypt's policy of "no war, no peace" had
outlived its usefulness. The Egyptians watched Israel's election campaign,
in which both the Labor Alignment and the Likud made glowing promises