The October (Yom Kippur) War • 351raised oil prices by as much as 50 percent. Then the Arab states (but not
Iran) agreed to put an embargo on the US and any European country
deemed excessively pro-Israel. They singled out the Netherlands, not so
much because of the Dutch government's policy but because most of the oil
shipped to northern Europe came through the port of Rotterdam. The oil
embargo failed to halt the airlift, but it did cause many European countries
to deny landing rights to US planes carrying arms to Israel. All these coun¬
tries publicly supported the Arab interpretation of Resolution 242. Even so,
oil supplies dwindled. With winter coming, European governments adopted
austerity measures to reduce fuel consumption and avert a crisis.
The Superpowers and the Cease-fire
By the third week of the longest war the Arabs and Israelis had fought
since 1948, both Egypt and Syria faced military defeat. The USSR, anxious
to avert their collapse, invited Kissinger to Moscow. The US government
might have exploited the Soviets' desire for Middle East stability, but it was
having its own problems. Aside from its fear of the Arabs' oil weapon and
the threat that more Arab states might enter the war, Washington was in
chaos. Vice President Agnew had just resigned. President Nixon had fired
his special Watergate prosecutor and accepted his attorney general's resig¬
nation, thus damaging his own credibility. Kissinger flew to Moscow to
draft with Communist Party Chairman Leonid Brezhnev a jointly accept¬
able Security Council resolution. There was to be a cease-fire in place, a
reaffirmation of Resolution 242, and immediate negotiations among the
parties to the conflict. This resolution was adopted by the UN Security
Council and accepted by Egypt and Israel—but not by Syria. Fighting con¬
tinued on both fronts, however, with Egypt and Israel accusing each other
of bad faith. By the time the Security Council passed a new resolution two
days later, Israel's forces in Egypt had surrounded Suez City and in Syria
had seized more land around Mount Hermon.
Many Israelis did not want this cease-fire; Egypt's Third Army was
trapped in Sinai east of Suez, and they could have crushed it. But Kissinger
reasoned that Egypt would be more apt to make peace if it could keep
some of its initial gains. The cease-fire was shaky, the troop lines were in¬
tertwined, and most observers feared that fighting would resume shortly.
Kissinger put US forces on red alert the next day, allegedly because Soviet
ships were unloading nuclear warheads at Alexandria; more probably the
USSR was insisting that Israel accept the cease-fire. Finally, under duress,
the Israelis complied.