356 • 18 WAR AND THE QUEST FOR PEACEgranted the PLO observer status at the UN. Meanwhile, the United Nations
Educational, Social, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) cut off finan¬
cial aid to Israel because of its "persistence in altering the historical features
of Jerusalem." In 1975 Israel became even more isolated when the General
Assembly passed, by a large majority, a resolution condemning Zionism as
a form of racism. It later repealed this resolution.
The PLO came to be recognized as a movement struggling for national
liberation and rebutted Zionist efforts to discredit its actions as "terrorist."
It justified acts of sabotage and violence against civilian Israelis, especially
intense in 1974, as retaliation in kind. Pro-Israel skeptics wondered if their
real purposes were to hamper Kissinger's peace efforts and to provoke
Israeli air raids on the fidaiyin in southern Lebanon. Some people argued
that if the Palestinians had a state on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip,
they would become more willing to accept Israel within its 1967 borders.
But Israelis, who rarely saw their ongoing occupation of Palestinian land
as a source of their own vulnerability, were not willing to take chances.
Return to Shuttle Diplomacy
In the winter of 1975, Kissinger launched a new series of talks with Egypt
and Israel aimed at an interim Sinai agreement to keep up the momentum
of the negotiations and to strengthen Sadat against rising Arab opposi¬
tion. Again Kissinger tried his shuttle diplomacy, which had worked well
in 1974. But the talks foundered on Israel's refusal to hand back the Sinai
oil fields or the strategic Gidi and Mitla passes and on Egypt's reluctance
to pledge itself to nonbelligerency as long as Israel kept parts of the Sinai.
When King Faysal of Saudi Arabia was killed in March by his nephew, the
Arab world seemed to be entering a new era of political instability. The US
government began reassessing its Middle East policy, a move toward what
could have been a more balanced approach. But in the end, Washington
simply delayed some arms deliveries to Israel and threatened to reduce US
economic aid, which now totaled $2 billion over the past two years.
Later that year, though, both Egypt and Israel became more accommo¬
dating. In June Sadat reopened the Suez Canal and allowed passage to ships
with Israeli cargoes. After yet another round of shuttle diplomacy, Kissinger
got a new Sinai accord. Israel gave up the passes and oil fields, as 100 US
civilian technicians joined the UN Emergency Force inside the buffer zone
separating the Egyptian and Israeli armies. Egypt renounced war as a
means of resolving the Middle East conflict, a statement widely interpreted
in other Arab capitals as a sellout, but neither the Palestinians nor any Arab