360 • 18 WAR AND THE QUEST FOR PEACEThe two main Lebanese parties to the conflict were the Phalanges, a long-
lived and largely Maronite force, and the Lebanese National Movement,
which was led by members of the Jumblat family and tended to be mainly
Muslim. President Sulayman Franjiyah openly backed the "Christian" side.
The "Muslim" side won the support of PLO leader Arafat. Savage fighting
alternated with shaky cease-fires for eighteen months, becoming most in¬
tense in and around Beirut, where the hotel district, the port, and residen¬
tial areas became battle zones. Fighting with bazookas and grenades, both
sides reduced buildings to rubble. Approximately 70,000 Lebanese (mostly
civilians) were killed, over a half-million people were left homeless, and
property damage exceeded $1 billion during 1975-1976.
Syria's Role
One puzzling aspect of this war was Syria's 1976 policy shift. Syria had deeply
resented France's severance of Lebanon during the mandate period, and
since independence the Syrians had hoped that someday the two countries
would be reunited. Mostly Muslim and generally the bellwether of Arab
nationalism, Syria had tended to side with any faction that would weaken
the pro-Western Maronites there. Naturally, then, President Hafiz al-Asad
should have backed the rebels during the Lebanese civil war. At first he did,
both morally and materially. But in January 1976 he managed to get Fran¬
jiyah and his opponents to accept a cease-fire and a political deal that would
require a slight shift in Lebanon's power balance in the Muslims' favor. But
the Muslim Lebanese, abetted by the PLO, rejected his proposed compro¬
mise. This rejection angered Asad and made him change sides. Syria sent
tanks and troops to enforce its carefully crafted settlement, attacked Lebanese
Muslims and the PLO, and battered them into submission by fall 1976.
An Arab summit meeting, held in Riyadh that October, devised a formula
by which Lebanon would go on being occupied by an Arab League peace¬
keeping force, made up mainly of Syrians. President Franjiyah was suc¬
ceeded by a pro-Syrian politician. But why did Asad, a self-styled champion
of Arab nationalism and socialism, protect Christian interests in Lebanon?
He wanted to keep the PLO weak enough so that his government could con¬
trol it; earlier he had quarreled with Yasir Arafat. Lebanon settled into an
uneasy truce, but the fighting had in fact partitioned the country—and
Beirut—between Christians and Muslims. Although some Christians still
lived peacefully within "Muslim" zones such as west Beirut, the Maronites
began building a new harbor and airport north of the city and treating their
area as a Christian version of Israel. Indeed, the Israelis seemed to agree. As a