386 • 19 THE REASSERTION OF ISLAMIC POWERthe number of people it had in 1952 but roughly the same amount of cul¬
tivable land. Its agriculture could not feed its own population, increasing by
1 million every year. The government urged family planning but also de¬
voted one-fifth of the state budget to subsidizing the purchase of basic
necessities to keep bread, sugar, butane gas, and kerosene affordable. The
subsidies benefited all buyers, even rich Egyptians and foreign residents. La¬
bor unemployment (or underemployment) held down Egyptian salaries
and wages. Men often could not afford to marry until they were thirty or
forty years old.
The frustration level in the early 1980s, therefore, was high. Many Egyp¬
tians felt that Sadat's policies could not or would not help them. Although
some Egyptians (especially the most educated) became Marxists, scientific
socialism had no general appeal in a highly religious society. Religion
scored major gains, among Copts as well as Muslims, after Egypt's 1967
defeat. Islamic groups permeated nearly all aspects of Egyptian life. The
Muslim Brothers survived Nasir's purges, and new secret societies arose.
Some resorted to terrorist acts. At first, Sadat promoted the formation of
nonrevolutionary Muslim societies to counter the Marxist and Nasirite
ones, especially at the universities. Muslims demanded that the Shari'a be
applied to all the country's laws. The Copts, about one-tenth of Egypt's
population, also became more politicized, and violent communal strife
broke out in a Cairo workers' district in July 1981. Even before then, Sadat
was clamping down on religious extremists, using popular referenda to
pass laws to curb opposition to his policies, including peace with Israel.
In September 1981 he banned the Muslim Brothers' popular magazine,
al-Dawa; imposed censorship on mosque sermons; and locked up 1,500
alleged opponents without trial. As the US government was spending $2
billion a year on economic, technical, and military assistance to Egypt,
mainly as a result of the treaty with Israel, many Americans failed to see
that Sadat had lost touch with his own people.
On 6 October, the eighth anniversary of Egypt's successful crossing of
the Suez Canal to attack the Israelis occupying the Sinai, Sadat and most of
his top officials were viewing a military parade in Victory City, a Cairo sub¬
urb. An army truck halted, apparently because of a mechanical failure, in
front of the presidential reviewing stand. Four soldiers jumped out. Think¬
ing they had stopped to salute him, Sadat rose to face them, whereupon
they pointed their machine guns at him and opened fire, murdering the
president and several of his aides. All but one of the assassins were killed.
Police investigations unearthed a large conspiracy, both within the army
and in Egypt generally, as well as a network of terrorist groups, of which
the best known was called al-Takfir wa al-Hijra (meaning, roughly, "Ex-