The Gulf Crisis • 401dam Husayn had accused Kuwait of pumping his country's share of oil
from their jointly owned Rumaylah oil field and of plotting to impoverish
Iraq by overproducing oil in order to drive down its price on the world
market. Efforts in late July by Egyptian President Husni Mubarak and
Saudi King Fahd to mediate between Iraq and Kuwait did not satisfy the
Iraqi leader. Foreign intelligence sources knew that Iraqi forces were mass¬
ing near Kuwait's border, but few expected Saddam to order an invasion.
However much they quarrel, Arab states seldom invade one another.
Iraq's invasion and subsequent annexation of Kuwait ignited a diplo¬
matic crisis. The other Arab states reacted slowly; an emergency Arab sum¬
mit was called but then canceled. Did Arab leaders ignore the obvious
danger? If Iraq could get away with invading a fellow Arab country, what
was to stop other strong states from seizing their most vulnerable neigh¬
bors? By contrast, the US government, emboldened by communism's re¬
treat in Europe and by Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev's tacit support,
rushed to fill the vacuum. It promptly condemned the invasion and froze
all Iraqi and Kuwaiti assets in the US. After winning the consent of the
Saudi government, George Bush's administration began airlifting troops
and supplies into the desert kingdom, which had formerly barred foreign
troops from Saudi territory—or had kept their presence as inconspicuous
as possible. By the end of October 1990, more than 200,000 American men
and women in uniform were encamped at undisclosed locations around
northeastern Saudi Arabia. In the following month, Bush would double the
size of that force, adding offensive units to the mainly defensive ones he
had already sent, a step that we now see as Washington's commitment to
driving the Iraqi forces from Kuwait. Many other countries, including
Egypt and Syria, sent troops to join in an "allied coalition" with the US
forces in what was officially termed Operation Desert Shield.
The UN Security Council passed a series of resolutions calling on Iraq
to withdraw unconditionally from Kuwait and on other member states to
impose economic sanctions against Iraq until it did so. Except for small
amounts of food and medicine, Iraq could not import any goods from
abroad, nor could it export any oil to earn the money needed to rebuild its
war-torn economy. As the sanctions tightened and Saddam did not flinch,
President Bush and British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher threatened
military action against Iraq. The US and its allies rebuffed mediation at¬
tempts by King Husayn of Jordan and other leaders, calling on Iraq to
obey the Security Council resolutions immediately and unconditionally.
For Saddam and his supporters, these demands were a direct challenge;
they refused to pull out.