Short Fragments and Testimonia from Uncertain Works
Short Fragments and
Testimonia from
lJncertain VVorks
Logic and epistemology
81
Philodemus Pragmateiai 29 Diano (212 U, [1-65]
137 A)
" ... bringing your letter and the reasoning which you had carried out
concerning men who could see neither the analogy which obtains between
the phenomena and the unseen [realities] nor the consistency which exists
between the senses and the unseen [realities] and again the testimony
against ... "
Seneca Letters on Ethics 89.11 (242 U) [1-66]
The Epicureans held that there are two parts of philosophy, physics
and ethics; they got rid of logic. Then since they were forced by the
very facts to distinguish what was ambiguous and to refute falsities lying
hidden under the appearance of truth, they themselves also introduced
that topic which they call 'on judgement and the criterion' [i.e., canonic];
it is [just] logic by another name, but they think that it is an accessory
part of physics.
Sextus M 8.9 (244 U) [1-67]
But Epicurus said that all sensibles were true and existing-for there
was no difference between saying that something is true and that it is
an existing object. And that is why, in giving an outline [definition] of
the true and the false, he says, "that which is such as it is said to be is
true" and "that which is not such as it is said to be is false."
Sextus M 7.203-16 (247 U) [1-68]
- Epicurus says that there are two things which are linked to each
other, presentation and opinion, and that of these presentation, which
he also calls 'clear fact,' is always true. For just as the primary feelings,
i.e., pleasure and pain, come to be from certain productive factors and in
accordance with the productive factors themselves (for example, pleasure
comes to be from pleasant things and pain from painful things, and what