Logic and Theory of Knowledge
Plutarch Stoic Self-Contradictions 1037b
(SVF 2.129)
131
[11-17]Having said in his book On the Use of Argument that one must not use
the power of argument for inappropriate ends, just as is the case with
weapons, he [Chrysippus] said this in addition: "One must use it for the
discovery of truths and for coordinated training in them, but not for the
opposite purposes, although many do this". By "many" he presumably
means those who suspend judgement [i.e., sceptics].Plutarch Stoic Self-Contradictions
1035f-1036a (SVF 2.127)[11-18](1035f) ... He [Chrysippus] says that he does not absolutely reject
arguments to opposite conclusions, but he does advise that this technique
be used with caution, as in the law courts-(1036a) not with a sense
of advocacy but to dissolve the plausibility of these arguments. "It is
appropriate," he says, "for those who urge suspension of judgement on
all things to do this, and it is helpful for their aim. But for those who
work to produce knowledge according to which we may live consistently,
the opposite is appropriate, to give instruction in basic principles to
beginners, from beginning to end. In this context it is timely to mention
the opposite arguments too, dissolving their plausibility just as in the
law courts."Sextus M 7.440-442 (SVF 2.118) [11-19]
- But in reply the dogmatists are accustomed to ask how the sceptic
can ever show that there is no criterion. For he says this either without
a criterion or with one. If without a criterion he will be untrustworthy;
and if with a criterion he will be turned upside down; while saying
that there is no criterion he will concede that he accepts a criterion to
establish this. - And we in turn ask, "if there is a criterion, has it been judged
[by a criterion] or not?"; and we conclude one of two things: either that
there is an infinite regress or that, absurdly, something is said to be its
own criterion. Then they say in reply that it is not absurd to allow that
something is its own criterion. 442. For the straight is the standard for
itself and other things and a set of scales establishes the equality of other
things and of itself and light seems to reveal not just other things but
also itself. Therefore, the criterion can be the criterion both of other
things and of itself.