Physics 177
from a body, but the soul is separated from the body, so that it is not
incorporeal.-117.28-29. Nor is it true to say that only those things
which touch each other can be separated from each other.-117 .30-118.2.
Nor is this true: 'we are animate because of that by which we breathe;
but we are animate because of the soul.' Not even if [it is true] that
animals cannot exist without inborn pneuma does it follow that this is
the soul.Alexander De Anima CIAG Supp. 2.1
p. 18.27-19.1 (SVF 2.793)[11-70]Nor does the argument which says, "that of which a part is a body is
itself also a body; but perception is a part of soul and is a body; so [the
soul] itself is a body,' prove anything.Galen On the Habits ofthe Soul4, 4.783-784
K. (SVF 2.787)[11-71]For they [the Stoics] claim that the soul is a kind of pneuma, as is
nature too; the pneuma of nature is more fluid and cool, while that of
the soul is drier and hotter. Consequently, [they also think this]: that
pneuma is a kind of matter proper to the soul, and in form the matter is
either a symmetrical blend of airy and fiery substance; for it is not possible
to say that it is either air alone or fire alone, since the body of an animal
does not appear to be either extremely cold or extremely hot, but rather
it is not even dominated by a great excess of either of these; for if there
is even a minor deviation from symmetry [in the blend] the animal
becomes feverish because of the unmeasured excess of fire, and it becomes
chilled and livid, or completely incapable of sense-perception as a result
of blending [excessively] with the air. For [air] itself in its own right is
cold, and becomes temperate as a result of mixture with the fiery element.
So it is immediately clear that the substance of the soul is a certain kind
of blend of air and fire, according to the Stoics, and that Chrysippus was
rendered intelligent because of a temperate mixture of these [elements].
Nemesius On the Nature of Man 2.
(SVF 1.518)
[11-72]- Cleanthes weaves a syllogism of this sort: not only, he says, are
we like our parents in respect to the body, but also in respect to the
soul, in our passions, characters and dispositions; but similarity and
dissimilarity are [properties] of body, and not of the incorporeal; therefore,
the soul is a body .... 78. Again, [Cleanthes] says: nothing incorporeal
shares an experience with a body, nor does a body with an incorporeal,