On Fate 181
How, then, can it be the case at one and the same time that god is
not partly responsible for anything shameful and that not even the smallest
thing can occur otherwise than according to the common nature and its
reason? For in everything which occurs surely there are some shameful
things too. And yet, Epicurus twists this way and that and exercises his
ingenuity (1050c) in his attempt to free and liberate voluntary action
from the eternal motion, so as not to leave vice free of blame, while
Chrysippus gives vice blatant freedom to say not only that it is necessary
and according to fate but even that it occurs according to god's reason
and the best nature. And this too is plain to see, when we provide the
following literal quotation: "for since the common nature extends into
everything, it will be necessary that everything which occurs in any way
in the universe and in any of its parts should occur according to it [the
common nature] and its reason, in proper and unhindered fashion, be-
cause there is nothing outside it which could hinder its organization nor
(1050d) could any of its parts be moved or be in a state otherwise than
according to the common nature."
Simplicius Comm. On Aristotle's Categories
13a37 CIAG 8, pp. 406.34-407.5 (SVF 2.198)[11-82]Concerning [pairs of] contradictories which bear on the future the
Stoics accept the same principle as they do for other statements. For
what is true of [pairs of] contradictories concerning things present and
past is also true, they say, for future contradictories themselves and their
parts. For either "it will be" or "it will not be" is true if they must be
either true or false. For they are fixed by the future events themselves.
And if there will be a sea-battle tomorrow, it is true to say that there
will be. But if there will not be a sea-battle, it is false to say that there
will be. Either there will or there will not be a battle; therefore, each
statement is either true or false.
Plutarch Stoic Self-Contradictions 1055de
(SVF 2.202)
[11-83](1055d) ... Surely his [Chrysippus'] account of possibility is in conflict
with his account of fate. (1055e) For if Diodorus' view of the possible
as "what either is or will be true" is not right but [Chrysippus' view is],
that "everything which permits of occurring even if it is not going to
occur is possible", then many things are possible which are not according
to fate. <Therefore, either> fate loses its character as unconquerable,
unforceable, and victorious over all things, or, if fate is as Chrysippus
claims, then "what permits of occurring" will often turn out to be