On Fate 185
unchangeable series and chain of things, rolling and unravelling itself
through eternal sequences of cause and effect, of which it is composed
and compounded" ....
- But authors from other schools make this objection to this definition.
- "If," they say, "Chrysippus thinks that everything is moved and
 governed by fate and the sequences and revolutions of fate cannot be
 turned aside or evaded, then men's sins and misdeeds should not rouse
 our anger, nor should they be attributed to men and their wills but to a
 kind of necessity and inevitability which comes from fate, mistress and
 arbiter of all things, by whose agency all that will be is necessary. And
 therefore the penalties applied by the law to the guilty are unfair, if men
 do not turn to misdeeds voluntarily but are dragged by fate."
- Against this position Chrysippus made many sharp and subtle argu-
 ments. But this is the gist of all he said on the topic: 7. although, he
 said, it is true that by fate all things are forced and linked by a necessary
 and dominant reason, nevertheless the character of our minds is subject
 to fate in a manner corresponding to their nature and quality. 8. For if
 our minds were originally formed by nature in a sound and useful manner
 then they pass on all the force of fate which imposes on us from outside
 in a relatively unobjectionable and more acceptable way. But if, on the
 other hand, they are rough and untrained and uncouth, supported by no
 good training, then even if the blows of fated misfortune which strike
 them are trivial or non-existent these men will plunge headlong into
 constant misdeeds and errors because of their own ineptitude and their
 voluntary impulse. 9. But this state of affairs is itself brought about by
 that natural and necessary sequence of cause and effect which is called
 fate. 10. For it is by the very nature of the case fated and determined
 that bad characters should not be free of misdeeds and errors.
- He then uses a quite appropriate and clever illustration of this
 state of affairs. "Just as," he says, "if you throw a cylindrical stone
 down a steep slope, you are indeed the cause and origin of its descent,
 nevertheless the stone afterwards rolls down not because you are still
 doing this, but because such is its nature and the 'rollability' of its form:
 similarly, the order and reason and necessity of fate sets in motion the
 general types and starting points of the causes, but each man's own will
 [or decisions] and the character of his mind govern the impulses of our
 thoughts and minds and our very actions."
- He then adds these words, which are consistent with what I have
 said: "So the Pythagoreans too said, 'You shall know that men have woes
 which they chose for themselves', since the harm suffered by each man
 is in his own power and since they err and are harmed voluntarily and
 by their own plan and decision."
