188 l/-90 to l/-92
nature. But if something were produced without an antecedent cause,
then it would be false that everything occurs by fate. But if it is probable
that a cause precedes all things which occur, what could block the conclu-
sion that all things occur by fate? Let it only be understood what difference
and distinction there is among causes."
- Since Chrysippus has clarified this, if his opponents who say that
assents do not occur by fate were nevertheless to concede that they do
not occur without a presentation as antecedent [cause]-then that is a
different argument; but if they grant that presentations precede and
nevertheless that assents do not occur by fate, on the grounds that it is
not that proximate and immediate [kind of] cause which moves the assent,
note that they are really saying the same thing [as Chrysippus]. For
Chrysippus, while granting that there is in the presentation a proximate
and immediate cause of assent, will not grant that this cause necessitates
assent in such a way that, if all things occur by fate, all things would
occur by antecedent and necessary causes. And similarly the opponents,
who disagree with him while conceding that assents do not occur without
prior presentations, will say that, if everything occurs by fate in the sense
that nothing occurs without a prior cause, it must be granted that all
things occur by fate.
From this it is easy to understand, since both sides get the same result
once their opinions are laid out and clarified, that they disagree verbally
but not in substance.
Plutarch Stoic Self-Contradictions 41,
1055f-1056d (SVF 2.935, 937, 994, 997)
[11-91](1055£) ... Moreover, what is said about presentations is also in
powerful opposition to [Chrysippus' view of] fate. For wanting to prove
that presentation is not a sufficient cause of assent, he has said that wise
men will be doing harm by producing false presentations in others if
presentations are sufficient to produce acts of assent; for wise men often
use a falsehood when (1056a) dealing with base men and produce a
persuasive presentation which is, however, not the cause of assent (since
in that case [a presentation] would also be the cause of false belief and
deception). So, if someone transfers this statement from the wise man
to fate and should say that the assents do not arise because of fate, since
in that case false assents and beliefs and deceptions would arise because
of fate, and people would be harmed because of fate, then the argument
which exempts the wise man from doing harm demonstrates at the same
time that fate is not the cause of everything. For if people do not hold
opinions and are not harmed because of fate, (1056b) it is clear that they