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administrator of the universe. So Diogenes says explicitly that the goal
is reasonable behaviour in the selection of things according to nature,
and Archedemus [says it is] to live carrying out all the appropriate acts.
- By nature, in consistency with which we must live, Chrysippus
understands both the common and, specifically, the human nature. Clean-
thes includes only the common nature, with which one must be consistent,
and not the individual. And virtue is a disposition in agreement. And it
is worth choosing for its own sake, not because of some fear or hope or
some extrinsic consideration. And happiness lies in virtue, insofar as
virtue is the soul [so] made [as to produce] the agreement of one's
whole life.
And the rational animal is corrupted, sometimes because of the persua-
siveness of external activities and sometimes because of the influence of
companions. For the starting points provided by nature are uncorrupted. - Virtue in one sense is generally a sort of completion [or: perfection]
for each thing, for example, of a statue. And there is also non-intellectual
virtue, for example, health; and intellectual virtue, for example, prudence.
For in book one of his On Virtues Hecaton says that those virtues which
are constituted out of theorems are knowledge-based and intellectual, for
example prudence and justice; but those which are understood by exten-
sion from those which are constituted out of theorems are non-intellectual,
for example health and strength. For it turns out that health follows on
and is extended from temperance, which is intellectual, just as strength
supervenes on the building of an arch. 91. They are called non-intellectual
because they do not involve assent, but they supervene even in base
people, as health and courage do.
Posidonius (in book one of his Ethical Discourse) says that a sign that
virtue exists is the fact that the followers of Socrates, Diogenes, and
Antisthenes were making [moral] progress; and vice exists because it is
the opposite of virtue. And that it is teachable (virtue, I mean) Chrysippus
says in book one of his On the Goal, and so do Cleanthes and Posidonius
in their Protreptics and Hecaton too. It is clear that it is teachable because
base men become good. - Panaetius, anyway, says that there are two [kinds of] virtues,
theoretical and practical; others [divide virtue into] logical, physical and
ethical. Posidonius' followers [say there are] four, and those of Cleanthes
and Chrysippus and Antipater [say there are even] more. But Apollo-
phanes says there is one virtue, viz. prudence.
Of virtues, some are primary and some are subordinate to these. The
primary are these: prudence, courage, justice and temperance. Forms of
these are magnanimity, self-control, endurance, quick-wittedness, and
deliberative excellence. And prudence is the knowledge of which things