Hellenistic Philosophy Introductory

Ethics 205
edge of fairness in a community; fair-dealing is knowledge of how to
deal with one's neighbours blamelessly.
5b3. The goal of all these virtues is to live consistently with nature.
Each one enables man to achieve this [goal] in its own way; for [man] has
from nature inclinations to discover what is appropriate and to stabilize his
impulses and to stand firm and to distribute [fairly]. And each of the
virtues does what is consonant [with these inclinations] and does its own
job, thus enabling man to live consistently with nature.
5b4. They say, then, that these virtues just listed are perfect in our
lives and consist of theorems; but others supervene on them, which are
no longer crafts but rather certain capabilities which come as a result of
practice; for example, health of the soul and its soundness and strength
and beauty. For just as the health of the body is a good blend of the hot
and cold and wet and dry elements in the body, so too the health of the
soul is a good blend of the beliefs in the soul. And similarly, just as
strength of the body is a sufficient tension in the sinews, so too the
strength of the soul is a sufficient tension in judging and acting and in
not doing so. And just as beauty of the body is a symmetry of its limbs
constituted with respect to each other and to the whole, so too the beauty
of the soul is a symmetry of reason and its parts with respect to the
whole of it and to each other.
5b5. All the virtues which are forms of knowledge and crafts have
common theorems and the same goal, as was said; and consequently they
are inseparable; for he who has one has them all, and he who acts with
one virtue acts with all. They differ from each other in their topics. For
the topics of prudence are, in the first instance, considering and doing
what is to be done, and in the second instance considering what one
should distribute <and what one should choose and what one should
endure>, for the sake of doing what is to be done without error. The
topic of temperance is, in the first instance, to make the impulses stable
and to consider them, and in the second instance [to consider] the topics
of the other virtues, for the sake of behaving without error in one's
impulses; and similarly courage in the first instance [considers] everything
which one should endure and in the second instance the topics of the
other virtues; and justice in the first instance looks to what is due to each
person, and in the second instance the other topics too. For all the virtues
consider the topics of all [the virtues] and those which are subordinate
to each other. For Panaetius used to say that what happened in the case
of the virtues was like what would happen if there were one target set
up for many archers and this target had on it lines which differed in
colour; and then each man were to aim at hitting the target-one by