206 l/-95
striking the white line, it might be, another by striking the black and
another by striking another coloured line. For just as these [archers]
make their highest goal the hitting of the target, but each sets before
himself a different manner of hitting it, in the same way too all the
virtues make being happy their goal (and this lies in living in agreement
with nature) but each [virtue] achieves this in a different manner.
5b6. Diogenes [of Babylon] says that there are two senses of 'things
worth choosing for their own sake and worth choosing in the final sense':^42
those set out in the previous division and those which have in themselves
the cause of being worth choosing (and this is a property of every
good thing).
5b7. They say that there are several virtues and that they are inseparable
from each other. And that in substance they are identical with the leading
part of the soul; accordingly, [they say] that every virtue is and is called
a body; for the intellect and the soul are bodies. For they believe that
the inborn pneuma in us, which is warm, is soul. And they also want [to
claim] that the soul in us is an animal, since it lives and has sense-
perception; and especially so the leading part of it, which is called intellect.
That is why every virtue too is an animal, since in substance it is the
same as the intellect; accordingly, they say also that prudence acts pru-
dently. For it is consistent for them to speak thus.
5b8. There is nothing between virtue and vice. For all men have from
nature inclinations towards virtue and, according to Cleanthes, are like
half-lines of iambic verse; hence, if they remain incomplete they are base,
but if they are completed [or: perfected] they are virtuous. They also
say that the wise man does everything in accordance with all the virtues;
for his every action is perfect, and so is bereft of none of the virtues.
5b9. Consistently with this they hold also that he [the wise man] acts
with good sense and dialectically and sympotically and erotically; but the
erotic man is so called in two senses, the one who is virtuous and gets
his quality from virtue, and the one who is blamed, who gets his quality
from vice-a sort of sex-fiend. And sexual love is .... [There is a lacuna
here.] And being worthy of sexual love means the same as being worthy
of friendship and not the same as being worthy of being enjoyed;^43 for
- telika, which probably means 'having the character of an ultimate goai'.The two senses
seem to be a narrow sense, which applies only to the virtues (below at Sg the virtues are
again said to be telika as well as instrumental) and a broader sense which includes all good
things, even the prudent man and the friend excluded from this category at Sg. We
dissent from Wachsmuth-Hense's correction of the the evidently corrupt text and follow
Heeren's emendation.
- See 11-94 (D.L. 7.130).
