Hellenistic Philosophy Introductory

Ethics 209
A more general sense and one extending also to the previous cases is:
that which is such as to benefit. Similarly, the bad too is defined in outline
by analogy with the good: that from which or by whom it characteristically
results that one is harmed; and that in accordance with which it character-
istically results that one is harmed; more general than these is that which
is such as to harm.
Se. Of good things, some are in the soul, some external, and some
neither in the soul nor external. In the soul are the virtues and
virtuous conditions and in general praiseworthy activities. External are
friends and acquaintances and things like that. Neither in the soul nor
external are virtuous men and in general those who have the virtues.
Similarly, of bad things, some are in the soul, some external, and some
neither in the soul nor external. In the soul are the vices together with
wicked conditions and in general blameworthy activities. External are
enemies together with their various forms. Neither in the soul nor external
are base men and all those who have the vices.
Sf. Of the goods in the soul, some are dispositions, some are conditions
but not dispositions, and some are neither conditions nor dispositions.
All the virtues are dispositions, while practices are only conditions but
not dispositions, for example, prophecy and the like. Virtuous activities,
for example, prudent action and the possession of temperance and the
like, are neither conditions nor dispositions. Similarly, of the bad things
in the soul, some are dispositions, some are conditions but not disposi-
tions, and some are neither conditions nor dispositions. All the vices are
dispositions, while tendencies, such as enviousness, resentfulness and
such things, are only conditions and not dispositions; so too for diseases
and ailments, such as greed, love of drink, and the like. Vicious activities
such as imprudent action, unjust action and things like that are neither
conditions nor dispositions.
Sg. Of good things, some are final, some are instrumental, and some
are both. For the prudent man and one's friend are only instrumental
goods, but joy and good spirits and confidence and prudent walking are
only final goods; all the virtues are both instrumental and final goods,
since they both produce happiness and fulfil it, becoming parts of it.
Analogously, of bad things some are instrumental to unhappiness, some
are final, and some are both. For the imprudent man and one's enemy are
only instrumental bad things, but pain and fear and theft and imprudent
questioning and similar things final ; the vices are
both instrumental and final bad things, since they produce unhappiness
and fulfil it, becoming parts of it.
Sh. Again, of good things some are worth choosing for their own sakes,
while some are instrumental; all those which are subject to reasonable