Ethics 249
otherwise. 11. In this man we came to understand perfect virtue, and
we distinguished it into parts: the desires were to be held in check, fears
repressed, plans made for action, what was owed was to be distributed;
so we grasped temperance, courage, prudence, and justice and we assigned
to each its own appropriate role. So where did we get our understanding
of virtue? It was shown to us by his orderliness, fittingness and consis-
tency, by the mutual harmony of all his actions, and by his greatness which
elevated itself above all else. This is the source for our understanding of
the happy life which flows smoothly in its own course and is completely
in control of itself.- So how did this make itself apparent to us? I shall tell you. This
perfect and virtuous man never cursed fortune, was never sad about what
happened, regarded himself as a citizen and soldier of the cosmos and
so endured all his labours as though he were under orders. Whatever
happened, he did not scorn it as inflicted upon him by chance, but took
it as a job assigned to him. He says, "This, whatever it may be, is mine;
it is harsh and difficult, but it is to this that I must devote my efforts." - A man who never whined over misfortune and never complained
about his fate of necessity appears to be great. He provided many people
with an understanding of himself, like a light shining in the darkness;
he attracted attention from everyone, though he was quiet and mild,
equally able to handle human and divine affairs. 14. He had a mind
which was perfect and had achieved its full potential; there is nothing
greater, except the mind of god, from whom some portion was diverted
into his mortal breast. This part is never more divine than when contem-
plating its mortality and realizing that man was born for dying, that his
body is not a home but a guest-house-and a brief one at that, since it
must be vacated when you see that you are a burden to your host.
Seneca Letters on Ethics 124.1-20 [11-110]
- ... The question is whether the good is grasped with the senses
or the mind; connected with this is the fact that the good is not found
in dumb animals and infants. 2. Those who make pleasure supreme hold
that the good is perceptible, but we on the other hand attribute it to the
mind and hold that it is intelligible. If the senses made judgements about
the good, we would not reject any pleasure; for no pleasure fails to attract
us and every pleasure pleases us; conversely, we would not willingly
suffer any pain; for every pain hurts our senses. 3. Moreover, those who
are excessively pleased by pleasure and who fear pain more than anything
else would not deserve criticism. But in point of fact we do disapprove
of those who are devoted to their bellies and to pleasure and we hold in