Hellenistic Philosophy Introductory

(Marvins-Underground-K-12) #1

258 //-117 to //-121


the impulse in the case of running and beyond reason in the case of
impulse. For the symmetry of natural impulse is that according to reason
and is as far as reason thinks proper. Therefore, since the overstepping
is according to this [sc. standard] and in this way, the impulse is said to
be excessive and an unnatural and irrational motion of the soul."


Galen On the Doctrines of Hippocrates and
Plato 4.4.16-18, 24-25 (5.385-387 K;
SVF 3.476)


[11-118]

Chrysippus himself shows this in the following quotation: "That is
why it is not off the mark to say, as some people do, that a passion of
the soul is an unnatural motion, as is the case with fear and desire and
things like that. For all such motions and conditions are disobedient to
reason and reject it. And so we say that such people are irrationally
moved, not as though they make a bad calculation, which would be the
sense opposite to 'reasonably', but rather in the sense of a rejection of
reason." ... 4.4.24 "That is what such conditions are like, uncontrolled,
as though they were not masters of themselves but were carried away in
the manner as those who run strenuously are swept away and cannot
control their motion. But those who move according to reason, as though
it were their leader, and steer their course by it wherever it might lead,
these people are in control of this sort of motion and the impulses that
go with it."


Plutarch On Moral Virtue 446f-447a
(SVF 3.459)


[11-119]

But some say that passion is not something distinct from reason, and
that there is no disagreement and strife between two things, but that the
reason which is a single thing turns in both directions, (447a) and this
escapes our notice because of the sharpness and speed of the change,
since we do not realize that it is the same thing in the soul which gives
us the ability to desire and to regret, to get angry and to fear, to be drawn
to shameful acts by pleasure and to fight back against this temptation. For
they say that desire and anger and fear and all such things are bad
opinions and judgments, and that they do not arise in some one part of
the soul, but are cases of the inclination, yielding, assent and impulse of
the leading part of the soul, and in general are activities which can change
in a very short time, just as the charging around of children is violent,
very unstable and uncertain because of their weakness.

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