Ethics
Galen On the Doctrines of Hippocrates and
Plato 5.1.4, 4.3.2 (5.429, 5.377 K; SVF 1.209)259
[11-120]In book one of his On Passions Chrysippus tries to show that the
passions are certain judgements [formed] by the leading part of the soul,
but Zeno did not believe that the passions were the judgements themselves
but contractions, relaxations, elations and depressions which supervene
on the judgements .... 4.3.2 [Chrysippus] is in conflict with Zeno on
this point, and with himself and many other Stoics who did not suppose
that the passions of the soul were judgments of the soul but rather the
irrational contractions, depressions, 'bites', elations and relaxations which
follow those [judgements].Galen On the Doctrines of Hippocrates and
Plato 5.2.49-5.3.8 (5.444-447 K; SVF 2.841)[11-121][Chrysippus said,] "There do exist parts of the soul out of which the
reason in it and the disposition in [the reason] are composed. And the
soul is honourable or shameful in accordance with the condition of its
leading part with respect to its proper divisions." What are these proper
divisions, Chrysippus, which will you write about next to get us out of
our difficulties? But you did not explain this here or in any of your books;
but just as though the whole central issue of the discussion of the passions
did not turn on this point, you immediately give up on teaching it and
drag out your discussion with irrelevant considerations. But you ought
to stick to the point and indicate just what these parts of the reasoning
part of the soul are. But since you have abandoned the argument-
whether intentionally or inadvertently I cannot guess-1 shall try to
follow your doctrines and discover your intention and then to consider
its truth, and I shall take my start from the passage just quoted, which
is: "There do exist parts of the soul out of which the reason in it is
composed." Perhaps you are reminding us of what you wrote in your
On Rational Discourse, where you explained that reason is an aggregation
of certain conceptions and basic grasps. But if you think that each of the
conceptions and basic grasps is a part of the soul, then you are making
two mistakes. First of all, you should not have said that they were parts
of soul but parts of reason, just as you have written in your On Rational
Discourse. For surely soul and reason are not the same thing; besides,
you proved in the preceding discussion that reason too is one of the
components in the soul-and the soul and a component in it are not the
same. And second, even if we let this first point go by without refutation,
still one should not call conceptions and basic grasps parts of the soul
but rather activities. But nothing is composed of its proper activities,