268 ///-7 to ///-10
be perceived while others are not. The other premisses they defend with
a complex and lengthy discussion; these other premisses are also two in
number, first that some presentations are true while others are false, and
second that every presentation coming from something true is such that
it could also have come from something false.- They do not just fly past these two propositions; rather, they
develop them with extraordinary care and diligence. For they first subdi-
vide [the argument] into major parts: [1] first the senses, [2] then the
inferences which we draw from the senses and ordinary experience (which
they want to claim is obscure), and [3] finally they come to the part in
which they claim that even with reason and inference it is not possible
for anything to be perceived. They divide these general arguments even
more finely; the method you saw them using on the senses yesterday is
also used for the other parts; for in each and every case-and they
subdivide very finely indeed-they want to show that true presentations
are coupled with false ones which differ in no respect from the true; and
since they are of this nature, they cannot be grasped.
Cicero Academica 2.59-60 [III-8]
- But the real absurdity comes with your statement that you follow
what is plausible, providing that you are not hindered by anything. First
of all, how can you fail to be hindered by the very fact that falsehoods
are not distinct from truths? Next, what criterion can there be of truth
if it is shared with falsehood? This, necessarily, was the origin of the
doctrine of epoche i.e., withholding of assent. Arcesilaus was more consis-
tent on this, if what some people say about Carneades is true. For if
nothing can be perceived-and this is what both of them thought-
assent must be eliminated. For what is more pointless than that anything
which is not known should be approved of? We kept hearing yesterday
that Carneades was in the habit of slipping into the concession that the
wise man would sometimes hold an opinion, i.e., make a [moral] mistake.
But I am not as certain that there is something which can be grasped
(and I have been arguing this thesis for quite some time now), as I am
that the wise man does not hold [mere] opinions, i.e., the wise man never
gives his assent to anything which is false or not known. - There remains their claim that one ought to argue pro and contra
everything, for the sake of discovering the truth. All right, then, I want
to see what they have discovered. He [Carneades] says, "it is not our
custom to set forth [our views]." Well, whatever are those mysteries?
Why do you hide your opinion as though it were something to be ashamed