272 ///-12 to ///-13
Plutarch Against Colotes 1122a-f [III-12]
(1122a) ... Not even those who concerned themselves a great deal
with this matter and wrote exhaustive books and tracts were able to shake
the doctrine of suspension of judgement on all questions. But at last the
Stoics brought against it like a Gorgon's head (1122b) the "argument
from inaction" and then gave up. For despite all their poking and twisting,
impulse refused to become assent and did not accept sense-perception
as the basic principle which tipped the scales [i.e., determined what one
would do], but it [i.e., impulse] turned out to lead to action all on
its own, not needing the assent [of the agent]. For debates with those
philosophers [i.e., sceptics] are carried out by the rules of dialectic and
"Such a word as you spoke, that you will hear as an answer".^6
But the discussion about impulse and assent, I think, gets no better
hearing from [the Epicurean] Colotes than lyre music gets from an ass.
The argument [of the sceptics] runs like this-for those who listen to it
and are capable of following it: there are three movements in the soul,
that of presentation, that of impulse, and that of assent. Presentation
cannot be removed even by those who want to, (1122c) but it is necessary
that those who meet with objects should be impressed and affected by
them; and impulse is awoken by presentation, and moves man to act
with respect to what is appropriate for him, as though a tipping of the
scales and an inclination occurred in the leading part [of the soul]. Now,
those who suspend judgement on all matters do not abolish this second
motion either, but they use impulse, which naturally leads a man towards
what is presented as being congenial to him.
What, then, is the only thing which the sceptics avoid? Only that
which is linked to falsehood and deception, i.e., holding opinions and
making a premature assent, which is a kind of yielding to what is pre-
sented, owing to weakness and is quite useless. For action requires two
things, a presentation of something appropriate for a man and an impulse
towards the thing presented as [being] appropriate. (1122d) Neither of
these is incompatible with suspension of judgement. For the sceptical
argument rejects opinion, not impulse or presentation. So, when what
is congenial to a man is presented one needs no opinion in order to move
and progress towards it, but the impulse, which is a motion and progress
of the soul, immediately comes along.
Indeed, it is their own claim [i.e., the Epicureans] that one need only
have sense-perception and be made of flesh for pleasure to appear to be
good. Therefore it will appear good even to someone who suspends
- Homer Iliad 20.250.