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offered it as a move in their argument against the Stoics. 151. For they
hold that there are three things linked to each other: knowledge, opinion,
and, placed between these, grasping. Of these, knowledge is sure and
stable grasping unalterable by reasoning; opinion is weak and false assent;
and grasping is what is between these, assent to a graspable presentation.
- According to the Stoics, a graspable presentation is true and such
that there could not be a false one just like it. They say that knowledge
is present only in the wise, opinion is present only in base men, but that
grasping is common to both groups, and that this is the criterion of truth. - These being the Stoics' views, Arcesilaus countered them by showing
that grasping is in no respect a criterion midway between knowledge and
opinion. For that which they call grasping and assent to a graspable
presentation occurs either in a wise man or in a base man. But if it occurs
in a wise man, it is knowledge, and if in a base man, it is opinion, and
there is nothing else left besides these two but a name. 154. And if
grasping is assent to a graspable presentation, it is non-existent, first,
because assent occurs not with respect to a presentation but with respect
to a statement, for assents are given to propositions; second, because
there is no true presentation such that there could not be a false one just
like it, as is shown by many and varied examples. 155. Since there is no
graspable presentation, grasping will not occur either, for the assent has
to be to a graspable presentation. And if there is no grasping, everything
will be ungraspable. Everything being ungraspable, it will follow, even
according to the Stoics, that the wise man suspends judgement. - Let us consider the matter in this way. Since everything is un-
graspable because of the non-existence of the Stoic criterion, if the wise
man gives assent, the wise man will opine, for since nothing is graspable,
if he gives assent to something, he will give assent to the ungraspable,
but assent to the ungraspable is opinion. 157. So, if the wise man is one
of those who give assent, the wise man will be one of those who opines.
But the wise man is surely not one of those who opines, for, according
to them, opining is a mark of imprudence and the cause of [moral]
mistakes. Therefore, the wise man is not one of those who gives assent.
If this is the case, he will have to refuse to give assent to everything.
And refusal to give assent is nothing else but suspension of judgement.
Therefore, the wise man will suspend judgement about everything. 158.
But since it was necessary after this [argument] to inquire into the conduct
oflife which naturally cannot be directed without a criterion, upon which
happiness too, that is, the goal oflife, depends for its reliability, Arcesilaus
says that he who suspends judgement about everything regulates choices
and avoidances and, generally, actions by reasonableness, and, proceeding
according to this criterion, will act correctly [perform morally perfect