Academic Scepticism 277
that we are not able to allow all presentations as a criterion of the truth,
but only, if any, the true presentation.- Again, since no one of these is true such that there could not be
a false one just like it, but rather for every one which is held to be true,
one exactly like it is found which is false, the criterion will turn out to
lie in a presentation common to the true and the false. But the presentation
common to both of these is not graspable and, not being graspable, it
will not be a criterion. 165. And if there is no presentation capable of
judging, reasoning too would not be a criterion, for reasoning is based
on a presentation. And this makes sense, for that which is to be judged
must first be presented to someone, and nothing is able to be presented
apart from non-rational sense-perception. So, neither non-rational sense-
perception nor reasoning would be a criterion. - These were the counter-arguments which Carneades set forth
against the other philosophers to the effect that the criterion does not
exist. But he himself when asked for some criterion for the conduct of
life and for the attainment of happiness, is virtually compelled to take a
position for himself on the topic, introducing the plausible presentation,
and [the presentation] which is at the same time plausible, uncontroverted,
and thoroughly tested. 167. The difference between these should be
summarily explained. The presentation is a presentation of something,
i.e., of that from which it arises and of that in which it arises-that from
which it arises being an external sensible object, and that in which it
arises, being, say, a man. Being such, it has two relations, one its relation
to the object presented, the other being its relation to the subject having
the presentation. 168. With respect to its relation to the object presented,
it turns out to be either true or false, true whenever it is in harmony
with the object presented, false whenever it is in disagreement with it. - With respect to its relation to the subject having the presentation,
the one [kind] is apparently true, the other apparently false. The appar-
ently true presentation is called a [representational] image by the Academ-
ics or plausibility or a plausible presentation; the one not apparently true
is designated as a non-[representational] image or implausibility or an
implausible presentation. For it is not what immediately appears false
nor what, though true, does not appear to us as such, [and so] does not
naturally persuade us. 170. Of these presentations, the sort that is clearly
false and not apparently true is to be ruled out and is not a criterion,whether it does
so but disagrees with that object and is not in accord with it, such as
was the case with the presentation derived from Electra and striking
Orestes when he thought that it was one of the furies and cried out,