278 ///-18
"Away! One of my furies!" 171. Of apparently true [presentations], one
kind is obscure, as for example, the kind where, owing to the smallness
of the object, or its considerable distance, or the weakness of sight, it is
received confusedly and not clear in outline; another kind is where besides
being apparently true, the presentation appears intensely so. 172. Of the
two kinds, the unclear and loose one would not be a criterion; for since
it indicates distinctly neither itself nor that which causes it, it does not
naturally persuade us nor induce us to assent to it. 173. On the other hand,
the presentation that is apparently true and adequately representative is
a criterion of the truth according to Carneades' school. As a criterion, it
admits of a fair degree of variation, and since it can be intensified [in its
clarity], one presentation will stand up against another as more plausible
and striking than another. 174. 'Plausible' is used in three senses in the
present discussion. In the first sense, it is true and apparently true; in
the second, it is [in fact] false, but it appears true; and in the third, it is
common to the two [i.e., appears to be true but could be either true or
false]. For this reason, the criterion will be the apparently true presenta-
tion which the Academics call plausible, 175. although it sometimes
happens to be the case that it is really false, so that sometimes we have
to use the presentation which is common to the true and the false. But
still because of the rarity of the occurrence of this kind, I mean those
that mimic the truth [by appearing to be true but really being false], one
should not distrust the one which is true for the most part. For as it
happens one's judgements and actions are regulated by what is so for
most part.
This, then, is the first and general criterion according to the school
of Carneades. 176. Since, however, presentations are never isolated, but
rather one depends upon another like links in a chain, that which will
be added as the second criterion to plausibility is the presentation that
is at the same time uncontroverted. For example, one who acquires a
presentation of a man necessarily receives a presentation of his attributes,
and of his external circumstances; 177. among the former are colour,
size, shape, movement, speech, dress, footwear, among the latter are the
air, light, day, the heavens, earth, friends, and all the rest. Whenever
none of these presentations drags us to and fro by appearing false, but
rather all appear true and consistent, we trust more [in the initial presenta-
tion]. 178. For that this man is Socrates we trust from [the presentation
of] all the customary characteristics belonging to him, colour, size, shape,
opinions, garment and his being in a place where there is no one else
exactly like him. 179. And just as some doctors do not conclude from
one symptom that someone is really feverish, for example, a quickened
pulse or just a high temperature, but from a combination of symptoms,