284 l/1-20 to /l/-22
ingly. Indeed, since we believe that he who withholds assent from every-
thing is nevertheless moved and does something, there remain presenta-
tions of the sort that excite us to action, and also those about which,
when questioned, we would be able to respond either way, following
only the claim that the presentation was like that, but still without assent.
However, we do not give assent to every presentation of this sort, but
only to those which nothing impedes.
- If we do not persuade you with these arguments, since they may
well be false, still they are certainly not despicable; for we do not destroy
the light, but rather we merely say that those things which you say are
perceived and grasped, 'appear', so long as they are plausible.
Cicero Academica 2.7-9 [III-21]
7 ... There remains one group of critics, by whom the Academic
argument is rejected. We would take this more seriously if anyone ever
approved of any philosophical school except the one which he himself
followed. But since it is our custom to advance our own views against
everyone else, we cannot object to others disagreeing with us.
Still, our case at least is straightforward; all we want to do is to discover
the truth without strife and this we pursue with the greatest care and
enthusiasm. For although all knowledge is beset by many hardships and
although there is so much unclarity in the things themselves and so much
weakness in our faculty of judgement that the most ancient and wise
thinkers were justified in doubting that they could discover what they
wished to, still, they did not give up and neither shall we weary and
abandon our enthusiasm for uncovering [what we seek]. The sole aim of
our discussions is to tease out-or, as it were, squeeze out-something
which is either true or comes as close to it as possible, by speaking on
both sides of the issue and listening [to our opponents]. 8. The only
difference between us and those who think that they know something is
that they do not doubt that the positions which they defend are true,
while we say that many things are plausible, those which we can easily
follow [in practice] but can hardly affirm.
But we are freer and more flexible just in so far as our ability to decide
lies wholly in our own hands; we are not compelled by any necessity to
defend a whole set of positions which are laid down like orders. For the
others are tied down and committed before they can decide what is best;
furthermore, it is when they are at the most vulnerable time of life that
they either follow some friend or become captivated by one speech given
by the first person they happen to hear and so make decisions about
things which are unknown to them. Having been carried off to whatever