Pyrrho 293
They pronounced the dogmatists to be simple-minded. For that which
is concluded on the basis of an hypothesis has the status of an assumption,
not an investigation. By means of this sort of argument, one may even
argue about impossibilities.
- As for those who think that one ought not to try to judge the truth
on the basis of the circumstances or to legislate on the basis of what is
natural, they say that such men make themselves the measure of all things
and did not notice that every appearance appears in accordance with
reciprocal circumstances and [our] disposition. Therefore, everything
ought to be said to be true or everything false. For if [only] some things
are true, by what means should they be distinguished? One will not
distinguish sensibles by sense-perception, since they are all equally appar-
ent to it; nor with one's intellect, for the same reason. But besides these,
there is no power available for deciding. Therefore, they say that whoever
is to make a firm assertion about a sensible or intelligible object, ought
to first establish what opinions there are on the matter. For some have
abolished one view and some another. 93. But [the truth] must be judged
either by means of a sensible or an intelligible and each of these is
disputed. So one cannot decide on the opinions concerning sensibles or
intelligibles; and if, because of the conflict among thoughts, one ought
to put no trust in any of them, the measure by means of which all things
are to be [known] with precision will be destroyed. Therefore, all [claims]
will be held to be equal. Further, they say, whoever investigates along with
us that which appears, is either trustworthy or not. If he is trustworthy, he
will have nothing to say to the man to whom the matter appears opposite.
For just as he himself is to be trusted who says the appearance [is one
way], so is the other man who says the opposite. If he is untrustworthy,
he will not be trusted when he reports on the appearance. - One ought not to suppose that that which persuades us is true.
For the same thing does not persuade everyone nor does it persuade the
same people constantly. Persuasiveness sometimes arises on the basis of
externals, the reputation of the speaker or his intellectual eminence or
wiliness, or on the basis of his familiarity or charm. Further they abolish
the criterion with this sort of argument. Either the criterion has been
judged or it has not. If it has not been judged, then it is untrustworthy
and it errs with respect to the true and the false. If it has been judged,
it [the criterion] will become one of the particulars being judged, so that
the same thing would [have to] judge and be judged, and that which has
served as a criterion will have to be judged by something else, which
itself will have to be judged by yet another and so on to infinity. - In addition to this, the criterion is subject to disagreement, some
saying that man is the criterion, some saying that the senses are, others