294 /l/-22
saying reason, and a few the graspable presentation. But man [sometimes]
disagrees with himself or with others, as is clear from the existence of
different laws and customs. And the senses are deceived and reason is
in disagreement. The graspable presentation is judged by the mind,
and the mind is altered in a variety of ways. Therefore the criterion is
unknowable, and because of this, so is the truth.
- Further, there is no sign. For if a sign exists, they say, either it is
sensible or intelligible. It is not sensible, since the sensible is public, but
a sign is private. And the sensible is one of the differentiated things
whereas the sign is relative. It is not intelligible, since the intelligible is
the apparent [idea] of an appearance, or a non-apparent [idea] of that
which is non-apparent, or a non-apparent [idea] of an appearance, or an
apparent [idea] of that which is non-apparent. But the sign is none of
these and so there is no sign. A sign is not the apparent [idea] of an
appearance, since the apparent does not require a sign; it is not the non-
apparent [idea] of the non-apparent, since that which is revealed by
something must be apparent; 97. it cannot be the non-apparent [idea] of
an appearance because that which provides the starting-point for grasping
something else must be apparent; nor is it the apparent [idea] of the non-
apparent, because the sign, being relative, must be grasped along with
that of which it is a sign, whereas it is not in this case. Thus, nothing
non-evident could be grasped, because it is by means of signs that non-
evident things are said to be grasped.
They abolish the cause in this way. A cause is a relative thing, for it
is relative to something causable. But relatives are only conceptual objects,
and do not exist. 98. Therefore, a cause is only a conceptual object, since
if it is a cause, it ought to accompany that of which it is a cause, otherwise
it will not be a cause. Just as a father would not be a father should
someone of whom he is the father not exist, so too for a cause: that in
relation to which the cause is conceived does not exist; for generation or
destruction or anything else [does not exist]. Therefore, a cause does not
exist. Moreover, if a cause does exist, either a body is a cause of a body,
or an incorporeal is a cause of an incorporeal, <or an incorporeal is a
cause of a body, or a body is a cause of an incorporeal>. But it is none
of these; so there is no cause. A body could not be a cause of a body,
since both have the same nature, and if either is said to be a cause, just
insofar as it is a body, the other thing, being a body, will become a cause. - But if both are causes, there will be nothing passive. The incorporeal
is not a cause of the incorporeal for the same reason. An incorporeal is
not a cause of a body since nothing incorporeal produces a body. A body
is not a cause of something incorporeal, because whatever is generated
must be in the category of passive matter. But if there is nothing passive