348 l//-39
true is eliminated, the individual arguments contrived by the dogmatists
are included.
Ch. ix Does That Which is True Exist in Nature?
- It being the case that there is disagreement among the dogmatists
regarding the true, some saying that something true exists and some
saying that there is nothing true, it is not possible to decide the disagree-
ment, since the one who says that something true exists will not be
trusted without a demonstration, because of the disagreement. And should
he wish to adduce a demonstration, if he agrees that it is a false one, he
will not be trusted, but if he claims that it is a true one, he will fall into
circular reasoning, and he will be required to provide a demonstration
that the truth of the demonstration exists, and another one for that, [and
so on] to infinity. But it is impossible to provide an infinite number of
demonstrations. So, it is impossible to know that there is something true. - Further, the 'something' which they say is the highest genus of
all, is either true or false, or neither true nor false, or both true and false.
If, therefore, they will say that it is false, they will be agreeing that all
things are false. For just as it follows that if animal is animate all particular
animals are animate, so if the highest genus of all, the 'something', is
false, so it follows that all particular ['somethings'] will be false and none
will be true. Connected with this, the conclusion is also drawn that
nothing is false. For the propositions 'everything is false' and 'there is
something false' will be false, since they are included in everything. If
the 'something' is true, everything will be true. Connected with this, the
conclusion is also drawn that nothing is true, at least if this existent
something itself, i.e., 'nothing is true', is true. 87. If the 'something' is
both false and true, each particular ['something'] will be false and true.
From this the conclusion is drawn that nothing is true by nature. For
that which has a nature of the sort that is true would certainly not be
false. If the 'something' is neither true nor false, it is agreed that all
particulars being said to be neither true nor false will not be true. And
for this reason, it will be non-evident to us if something is true. - In addition to these arguments, either the things that are true are
[only] appearances or only non-evident, or some of the things that are
true are non-evident and some appearances. As we shall show, none of
these are true, and therefore, nothing is true. If, then, the true things
are only appearances, either they will say that all appearances are true
or some. If they say 'all,' the argument is overturned. For it does appear
to someone that nothing is true. If they say 'some,' no one is able to say
that these are true and those false, without some means of deciding
between the two, but if he employs a criterion, either he will say that