350 l/1-39 to /l/-40
alone are true, nor some appearances true and some non-evident things,
nothing is true. If nothing is true, and the criterion seems to need that
which is true for judgement, the criterion is useless and empty, even if
we should grant as a concession that it has some existence. And indeed
if we ought to suspend judgement regarding whether there is something
true, it follows that those who say that dialectic is the knowledge of false
things and true things and that which is neither, are being rash.
- Since the criterion of truth appears to be doubtful, it is no longer
possible to assert anything confidently about that which seems to be
clearly evident, as far as concerns what the dogmatists say, nor about
things non-evident. For, since the dogmatists believe that they grasp
non-evident things from the clearly evident, if we are compelled to
suspend judgement regarding that which is called clearly evident, how
could we dare to pronounce about non-evident things? - Out of our abundant supply, we shall raise further particular
objections against non-evident things. And since non-evident things seem
to be grasped and confirmed by means of sign and demonstration, we
shall suggest briefly that it is appropriate to suspend judgement regarding
the sign and the demonstration. Let us begin with sign, for the demonstra-
tion seems to be a species of sign.
Sextus PH 2.97-133 [III-40]
Ch. x On Sign
- According to the dogmatists, then, some matters are self-evident
and some are non-evident. Of the non-evident ones, some are totally
non-evident, some temporarily non-evident, and some naturally non-
evident. And they say that self-evident ones are those that come to be
known by us, all on their own, for example, that it is day [when it is
day]; those that are totally non-evident are those that do not naturally
fall within our grasp, as, for example, that the stars are even-numbered; - those that are temporarily non-evident are those that have an evident
nature that is temporarily made non-evident to us in certain external
circumstances, as, for example, the city of Athens is non-evident to me
now; those that are by nature non-evident are those that do not have a
nature such as [ever] to be evident to us, as, for example, the intelligible
pores, for these are never apparent all on their own, but, if at all, they
would be thought to be grasped by inference from something else, such
as [the presence of] sweat or something similar. 99. Thus, they say that
self-evident things are not in need of a sign, for they are grasped all on
their own. Nor are the matters that are totally non-evident, since in the
first place they are not grasped at all. Those that are occasionally non-