The Testimony of Cicero 49
to accept the view of the Epicureans, who say that such propositions are
neither true nor false, or, since they are ashamed of that, say what is [in
fact] even more outrageous: that disjunctions of such contradictories are
true, but that neither of the propositions contained in them is true. 38.
What an amazing audacity and what a wretched ignorance of logic! For
if in speech there is something which is neither true nor false, certainly
it is not true. But how can what is not true not be false? Or how can
what is not false not be true? So the principle defended by Chrysippus
will be retained, that every proposition is either true or false. Reason
itself will require that certain things be true from all eternity, that they
not have been bound by eternal causes, and that they be free from the
necessity of fate ....
- This is how this matter should be discussed, rather than seeking
help from wandering atoms which swerve from their [natural] course.
He says, "an atom swerves." First of all, why? Democritus had already
given them another kind of force, that of collision, which he called a
"blow"; and you, Epicurus, had given them the force of heaviness and
weight. What new cause, then, is there in nature which would make the
atom swerve? Or surely you don't mean that they draw lots with each
other to see which ones will swerve and which not? Or why do they
swerve by the minimal interval, and not by a larger amount? Or why do
they swerve by one minimal interval, and not by two or three? This is
wishful thinking, not argument. 47. For you do not say that the atom
moves from its place and swerves because it is struck from outside, nor
that there is in the void through which the atom moves any trace of a
cause for it not to move in a straight line, nor is there any change in the
atom itself which would cause it not to maintain the natural motion of
its weight. So, although he adduced no cause to produce that swerve,
he still thinks that he is making sense when he makes the claim which
everyone's mind rejects and recoils from. 48. And I do not think that
there is anyone who does more to confirm, not just fate, but even a
powerful necessity governing all things, or who has more effectively
abolished voluntary motions of the mind, than [Epicurus], who concedes
that he could not have resisted fate in any other way than by taking
refuge in these fictitious swerves. For even supposing that there were
atoms, which can in no way be proven to my satisfaction, nevertheless,
those swerves will remain unexplained. For if it is by natural necessity
that atoms move [downwards] owing to their weight, since it is necessary
that every heavy body should move and be carried along when there is
nothing to prevent it, then it is also necessary for certain atoms (or, if
they prefer, all atoms) to swerve, ... naturally ...
