The Testimony of Cicero 53
necessity which you call heimarmene, and which leads you to say that
whatever happens has flowed from an eternal [set of] truth[s] and a
continuous chain of causes. But how much is your philosophy worth, if
it thinks, like old women-and uneducated ones at that-that everything
occurs by fate. Your mantike follows too, which is called 'divination' in
Latin, because of which we would be drenched in such superstition (if
we were prepared to listen to you [Stoics]) that we would have to worship
the soothsayers and augurs, the oracular priests and the prophets, and
even the diviners! 56. We are freed from these terrifying fears by Epicurus;
we are liberated from them! We do not fear [gods] whom we know do
not create trouble for themselves nor for anyone else, and we worship
in piety and holiness their excellent and supreme nature.
On the Nature ofthe Gods 1.69-76 excerpts [1-17]
- You [Epicureans] do this all the time. You say something implausi-
ble and want to avoid criticism, so you adduce something which is
absolutely impossible to support it! It would be better to give up the
point under attack than to defend it in such a brazen manner. For
example, when Epicurus saw that, if the atoms moved by their own
weight straight down, nothing would be in our power, since the atoms'
movements would be certain and necessitated, he found a way to avoid
necessity-a point which had escaped Democritus' notice. He says that
an atom, although it moves downward in a straight line because of its
weight and heaviness, swerves a little bit. 70. This claim is more shameful
than the inability to defend the point he is trying to support. He does
the same thing in his debate with the dialecticians. They have an accepted
teaching to the effect that, in all disjunctions which have the form "either
this or not this," one of the two disjuncts must be true; but Epicurus
was afraid that if a statement such as "Epicurus will either be alive
tomorrow or he will not" were admitted, then one of the two disjuncts
would be necessary. So he denied that all statements of the form "either
this or not this" were necessary. What could be more stupid than this?
Arcesilaus attacked Zeno because, while he himself said that all sense-
perceptions were false, Zeno said that some were false, but not all.
Epicurus was afraid that, if one sense-perception were false, none would
be true; so he said that all sense-perceptions were messengers of the
truth. None of these cases shows great cleverness; in order to ward off
a minor blow, he opened himself up to a more serious one. - He does the same thing with the nature of the gods. While trying
to avoid saying that [the gods are] a dense compound of atoms, so that
he will not have to admit that they perish and dissipate, he says that the