Hellenistic Philosophy Introductory

The Polemic of Plutarch 71
image came is not bent. So since the [internal] experience is different
from the external object, either our conviction must limit itself to the
experience or, if it makes the further claim that 'it is' in addition to 'it
appears', it must be refuted. And their vociferous and indignant claim
about sense-perception, that it does not say that the external object is
warm but that the experience in [the perception] is like that-(1121c)
is this not the same as what is said about taste, viz. that he denies that
the external object is sweet but says that an experience and motion in
the [organ of] taste is of this character? And he who says that he receives
a presentation in the shape of a man, but that he does not perceive
whether there is a man, now where did he get the inspiration [for such
an idea]? Was it not from those who say that they receive a curved
presentation, but that the visual organ does not make the additional
pronouncement that it is curved, nor even that it is round, but that a
certain round impression and imprint has occurred in it?
'Yes, by Zeus,' someone will say, 'but when I approach the tower and
when I take hold of the oar, I will pronounce the one to be straight and
the other to be polygonal, but the other [philosopher] will agree to
seeming and appearance, but nothing more, even if he does get close [to
the object].' Yes, by Zeus, (1121d) because, dear sir, he [Epicurus] sees
what follows [from his position] better than you do, and he sticks with
it: viz. that every presentation on its own account is equally trustworthy
and that no presentation is preferable to another, but that all are of equal
value. But you are giving up the principle that all [perceptions] are true
and that none is unreliable or false if you think that based on these one
ought to further pronounce regarding external objects, but did not trust
them for anything beyond the experience itself. For if they are equally
trustworthy when they appear close up and when they are distant, either
it is right to allow judgement to pronounce further, based on all of them
or not to allow this for even these. But if there is a difference in the
experience according as we are standing at a distance or close by, then
it is false to say that one presentation or sense-perception (1121e) is not
clearer than another; similarly, the testimony for and testimony against
about which they speak have nothing to do with sense-perception, but
rather with opinion. So, if they urge us to follow these and to pronounce
on external objects, they make opinion judge what is the case and make
sense-perception experience the appearances, and they transfer the decid-
ing power from what is in all circumstances true to what is often mistaken.