the new russian nationalismThe evolution of political structures
Three ever- present factors impact upon the development of the
radical nationalists’ political structures. First, these structures
maintain close links with the militant sector of radical youth
groups. Radical nationalist political leaders consider breaking
away from these groups to be an extremely risky strategy, as
that would raise the serious issue of who, then, would actually
support them. Second, they have to establish relations with the
authorities in such a way as to avoid being crushed by them, but
without appearing to be puppets, as viewed by potential sup-
porters. Accusations that leaders have ‘caved in’ or ‘sold out’
are common in any radical opposition group, so it is essential to
make sure that such impressions do not spread. Third, they have
to broaden the social base somehow, and that will involve learn-
ing to appeal to the man in the street and not only the committed,
ultra- rightist warrior.
It is no easy task to take all these factors into account, so
the political trajectories of prominent nationalist leaders are
understandably less than direct. Since 2008 the DPNI, together
with the national democrats, has firmly positioned itself in
the opposition. During the same period, Russian Image has
combined apolitical rhetoric with sheltering militants, whereas
the respectable and ‘mature’ Russian All- People’s Union has
attracted younger, more radical activists to its leadership and
core membership.
At the same time, in an effort to present themselves as not
too radical, and to network more widely with potential new
participants, all radical nationalist organisations take part in a
broad range of initiatives that are not entirely political, but may
be ecological, charitable or preservationist. Moreover, after some
ten years, a wave of ‘civil rights activism’ is developing, by which
the ultra- right understand the protection of their foot soldiers,
including those sentenced or accused of serious violent crime.^18
There is also a political angle to ‘the defence of the rights of the
Right’. Since 2009 the radical nationalists have increasingly pre-
sented themselves as defenders of freedom of speech (although
their ‘prisoners of conscience’ are, in fact, most often sentenced