backing the ussr 2.0detailed analysis of custom mass opinion surveys from Russia on
nationalism and ethnic relations.
The data and the measures: Pre- Ukraine crisis opinion
baseline
Publicly reported regular opinion surveys in Russia – based on
randomised national population samples – typically aggregate
into silence the voices of ethnic minorities. In Russia, the Levada
Centre, FOM, Romir and other reputed polling agencies, as well
as the Kremlin- run VTsIOM, tend not to report the differences
between ethnic Russian and ethnic non- Russian respondents.^6
This includes their regular political and socioeconomic monitor-
ing polls, as well as the Ukrainian crisis and Crimea annexation
surveys noted above.
Moreover, paradoxical as it may appear, surveys conducted at
the time of Russia’s actual territorial expansion are unlikely to
provide the data necessary to differentiate majority from minor-
ity support for such policy. The Kremlin’s patriotic, pro- russkie
media barrage since late 2013 created a context that has made
it practically impossible to tease out long- held durable prefer-
ences of respondents from the spur- of- the- moment, media- and
peer- pressure induced responses in the atmosphere of patriotic
fervour. As former US President George W. H. Bush discovered,
patriotism- inflated popularity can ebb quickly – after hitting
89 per cent after the Gulf War in February 1991, his approval
ratings plummeted to 29 per cent in July 1992.^7 Furthermore,
as regards research design, lack of variation on the outcome
variables of interest means that the 2014 surveys on Crimea’s
annexation and Putin’s leadership and related issues offer little
usable data for systematic comparison of ethnic minority and
ethnic majority views.
Fortunately, survey data from shortly before the Ukraine crisis
are available to investigate social bases of support among Russia’s
ethnic minorities for Putin’s leadership and Russian expansionist
nationalism. With the surveys conducted just a few months before
the Ukrainian crisis, the data are likely to capture relatively recent
yet probably durable public preferences in Russia, while offering