the new russian nationalismmotivation. The reference to ‘Soviet’ in the second item is a hypo-
thetical proxy measure of non- ethnic (civic) identity motivation
(see Table 6.1 for descriptives). The ‘without the North Caucasus’
option implies agreement with Russia’s territorial contraction.
But since only one answer could be chosen, this does not rule
out a latent preference for expansion to other parts of the former
Soviet Union or elsewhere – merely that the exclusion of the
North Caucasus was seen as a priority.
Ethnic and civic ingroup pride was gauged with two survey
questions asked as a cluster in all four NEORUSS polls: ‘How
proud are you of your ethnic identity?’, followed by ‘And how
proud are you to be a citizen of Russia?’ Responses were on a
standard four- point agreement/disagreement scale with 1 = agree
completely and 4 = disagree completely. The rationale for using
both measures was to contrast state/institutional identity com-
mitment and ethnic/non- state group identity commitment, both
within and between the sub- samples.
Voting preferences were measured with two questions. The
first one, included in all polls, asked: ‘Did you vote in the Russian
Federation’s presidential election on 4 March 2012? If yes, for
which candidate did you vote?’ Only one answer was allowed.
Responses were recoded into two variables – a dummy for voting
for Putin in 2012 (0 = no, 1 = yes) and a dummy for voting in
2012 (0 = vote, 1 = no vote). The second question was: ‘If a presi-
dential election in Russia were held today, for whom would you
vote?’ Only one answer was allowed. Responses were recoded
into two variables – a dummy for the intent to vote for Putin in
2013 (0 = no, 1 = yes) and a dummy for voting intent in 2013
(0 = vote, 1 = no vote). This question was asked in the national
survey only.
Economic valuation was operationalised as a five- point scale
based on responses to the question asked in all four NEORUSS
polls: ‘Do you feel that in the past 12 months the state of the
Russian economy has become much better, somewhat better,
has not changed, become somewhat worse, or much worse?’
Valuations of this kind are likely to be particularly diagnostic
of Putin’s approval ratings as president, given the importance
that Putin has attached in his public statements to his leader-