backing the ussr 2.0
group hailing from the Caucasus or Central Asia (N = 36) – but
was favoured by 34.2 per cent of the Ukrainians (N = 38). The
difference between the Slavs (N = 45) and the non- Slavs (N = 121)
on this question was statistically significant. Still, it is also notable
that almost two- thirds (65.8 per cent) of the ethnic Ukrainians
surveyed and four out of seven Belorussians opted not to support
the Slavic Union. The difference- of- means tests on Slavic versus
non- Slavic views within the non- Russian sub- sample, however,
are not as substantively reliable as those on the views between the
Russian versus non- Russian sub- samples, given the small n within
the sub- sample for specific ethnic groups. The same goes for one
other result evident from this comparison: that support for the
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
% respondents 2013 NEORUSS surveys
Like now but withoutthe North Caucasus’Muslim republics
Like now
Like now but addingUkraine and Belarus
Like the
former USSR Do not know
Ethnic non-Russians
Ethnic Russians
Figure 6.3 Russia territorial identity preferences in the 2013 NEORUSS
surveys among ethnic Russian and non- Russian respondents