the new russian nationalism(electoral support for Putin). It is also unlikely that support for
Russia’s territorial identity was a by- product of a somewhat
larger, although statistically significant, self- reported non- voting
rate among ethnic non- Russians in the 2012 presidential election.
The results offer important insights into the theory puzzles that
set the stage for this analysis. They are twofold. First, the tests
help to rule out the causal arguments that predicted no difference
or less support among ethnic non- Russians for Russian territo-
rial expansion to a USSR 2.0, as well as the causal arguments
that predicted no difference or less support among non- Slavs
than among Slavs and Russians for Russia expanding to a Slavic
Union. In other words, ethnic identity was found to matter in
intergroup status reassessment. From the instrumentalist/group
threat perspective, this means that the logic of intergroup compe-
tition may not apply to inter- minority competition, and the logic
of incentives for defection from minority ingroups to majority
outgroups (‘holier than the Pope’ effect) may not be as potent as
may be expected when the intergroup boundary is ethnic. From
the constructivist/social identity perspective, the findings suggest
that when intergroup boundaries run along minority–majority
lines, group homogeneity (or ‘entitativity’) is not as important as
the theory may predict – whether what is at issue is the assessment
of minority ingroup homogeneity or majority outgroup homoge-
neity. In other words, status does matter in intergroup identity
evaluations. Status and identity are likely to be relational; they
provide interactive motivations. But how are they related or do
they interact?
This is what the second insight from the empirical analysis is
about. It brings in the state – a distinct political science contribu-
tion to the study of intergroup relations. It suggests that instru-
mentalist (status) and constructivist (identity) motivations are
themselves contingent on perceived state power and institutional
design. The Russian case is uniquely suited for exploring the
impact of the latter, because it is part of a region where interstate
borders have been disputed and in flux and, in many respects, not
readily imagined as permanent, given how fast the Soviet Union
collapsed and how long the legacies of its unresolved border
issues lasted. We should recall the thousands of miles of still non-