the new russian nationalismFigure 6.5 shows the logic of prospective status valuations. The
relative size of each group is approximate, but this is immaterial,
for the important thing here is relative group position. Ethnic
Russians have the largest size relative to all other groups under
the Russia Redux state identity scenario. Ethnic non- Russian
Slavs have the best relative group position in the Slavic Union,
and the non- Slavs with the USSR 2.0 option. By combining
Figures 6.4 and 6.5, we see that the preferred state identity among
respondents was one in which the ratio of ‘their’ ethnic group to
other ethnic groups was the highest. Independent samples t- tests
for statistical significance validated these results. For the ‘Status
Quo’ option, all differences of means among the three groups
were statistically insignificant, as expected. For the remaining
three options, all differences between high and low group means
were statistically significant: for ‘Russia Redux’ – Russian versus
non- Russian Slavs p = .031*; for the Slavic Union – non- Russian
Slavs versus non- Slavs, p = .006*; and for the USSR 2.0 – non-
Slavs versus Russians, p = .023 (groups with high means listed
first). Thus we see how state identity lays down the tracks along
which group status valuations become meaningful and signifi-
cantly affect individual preferences.
Implications for the Russian state, Putin’s leadership and
nationalism
The findings suggest that Putin’s expansionist policy in the ter-
ritories of the former Soviet Union under the banner of Russian
nationalism and triumphalism over the annexation of Crimea
from Ukraine – as paradoxical as it may seem – is unlikely to
alienate a significant number of Russia’s ethnic minorities. Three
indicators are the most telling. First, Russia’s ethnic minorities
were just as much in favour of Russian territorial expansion as
were the ethnic Russians. The distinction between the ethnic non-
Russian Slavs and non- Slavs within Russia, however, suggests
that support for Russian nationalist expansionism – and, spe-
cifically, on expanding into Ukraine – would be stronger among
ethnic minorities if framed as part of rebuilding a USSR 2.0
than creating a Slavic Union (if anything, due simply to the fact