backing the ussr 2.0that Russia has a larger non- Slavic population than a Ukrainian
and Belarussian population). The bottom line on Ukraine is that
incorporating Ukraine into Russia or into a Russia- led interstate
union would get strong support among ethnic Russians and non-
Russians alike.
Second, pride in Russian citizenship was just as high among
ethnic non- Russians as it was among ethnic Russians. The ratio
of pride in ethnicity over pride in citizenship was the same across
these groups. This means that, fundamentally, Russia’s ethnic
minorities could be just as patriotic and support Putin’s Ukraine
policy just as adamantly as the ethnic Russian majority. Their
pride in Russia hardly needs a boost of nationalist, patriotic
fervour. It was so high already in 2013 that there was hardly any
room for expanding.
Third, support for Putin as president appears basically strong
among ethnic non- Russians. While voting preferences may change
quickly, the surveys find – importantly – that Putin can bank on
an overwhelming sense among ethnic minorities that the Russian
economy has been doing well and has good prospects. This senti-
ment was shared with ethnic Russians, and is typically a strong
indicator of support for incumbent politicians. Moreover, the
data show that even those ethnic non- Russians who may be wary
of or protest against the rise of Russian chauvinism or the resur-
gence of Soviet legacies of ethnic minority discrimination and
oppression are most likely to do so in silence.
In a twist that favours Putin’s rule, not only has territorial
expansion in the former Soviet space a solid basis of support
among ethnic non- Russians: it also appears to be reducing exclu-
sionist sentiments among ethnic Russians that had remained
consistently strong for more than a decade. Moderately reliable
VTsIOM polls found that support for the slogan ‘Russia for
Russians’ (Rossiia dlia russkikh) dropped to 38 per cent in May
2014 compared to 50 per cent in September 2013. Over the same
period, support for Russia as a multi- ethnic state rose to 57 per
cent from 44 per cent (Rustamova 2014). This would indicate
that territorial expansion – or institutional expansion entailing
greater Russian influence over former Soviet territories – may pay
a double dividend in reducing both majority ethnic intolerance